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ABSTRACT 
 
American Depository Receipts (ADRs) represent shares of foreign firms that are issued 
and traded in the U.S. Since an ADR and its underlying shares represent ownership interest of 
the same firm, they should be perfect substitutes in a perfect market. However, market 
imperfections such as differences in information environment, liquidity, investment and trading 
restrictions, taxes, control right, corporate governance might make them less-than-perfect 
substitutes. These imperfections, on the other hand, also present opportunities for research. 
This dissertation consists of two essays on ADRs, both related to the effects of less-than-
perfect information. Specifically, the first essay examines the return and volatility transfers 
between ADRs and their underlying home shares. Our investigation differs from the previous 
studies in that we cover substantially more countries and that we attempt to explain the variations 
in the extents of transfer effects both across firms and across countries. Various hypotheses are 
developed, based on the premise that barriers associated with trading, investments, and corporate 
governance would lower the extent or effectiveness of transfers. Overall, our empirical results 
support these hypotheses.  
The second essay takes the viewpoint of the issuing firms. Supposedly, an issuer’s timing 
and dollar amount raised depend on the conditions of three markets: its home equity market, the 
U.S. equity market, and the currency market. From purely the standpoint of information 
accessibility, ADR issuers are likely to time their issues or set their amounts with respect to the 
conditions of the home equity market and/or currency market, with which they are more familiar. 
On the other hand, issuers typically employ the assistance of U.S. investment banks, and 
therefore they may be well-informed about the U.S. equity market. This is largely an empirical 
issue. Generally, our empirical results are mixed, but there is somewhat stronger evidence for the 
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U.S. equity market being more important when setting the issue amount. There is also evidence 
that suggests regulations having influences on such activities.
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Keywords: ADR, Information Transmission, Return Transfer, Volatility Transfer, Investment 
Restriction, Investor Protection, Ownership, GARCH Model, Market Timing, Information 
Asymmetry, Country Regulation  
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 CHAPTER 1 
DETERMINANTS OF RETURN AND VOLATILITY TRANSFER BETWEEN ADRS 
AND THEIR UNDERLYING STOCKS 
 
1.1 Abstract 
This essay examines both the return and volatility transfers between American 
Depository Receipts (ADRs) and their underlying stocks. The sample consists of 145 ADR-
underlying stock pairs of firms in 25 countries trading during the period from January 2003 to 
December 2007. Our investigation differs from the previous studies in that we cover 
substantially more countries and that we attempt to explain the variations in the extents of 
transfer effects across firms and countries. Various hypotheses are developed, based on the 
premise that barriers associated with trading, investments, and corporate governance would 
lower the extent of transfers. Overall, our results support the hypotheses. Some of the notable 
and significant results are described as follows. The extent of market developments increases the 
bi-directional return transfers and the unidirectional volatility transfers from the ADRs to their 
underlying stocks. Corporate governance, as measured by disclosure requirement, tends to 
promote information transfer. Noise trader risk lowers the return transfer from the underlying 
stocks to the ADRs and the volatility transfer in the reverse direction. Synchronicity lowers the 
return transfer from the ADRs to their underlying stocks but increases it in the opposite direction 
and the bi-directional volatility transfer as well. Proportion of trading in the U.S. increases the 
return transfer from ADRs to their underlying stocks. Market liquidity increases the return 
transfers but lowers the volatility transfer from the ADRs to their underlying stocks. Taken 
together, these findings indicate that trading and governance have effects on the magnitude of 
return and volatility transfer effects.  
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1.2 Introduction 
If two markets are closely linked in the form of derivatives and their underlying securities, 
changes in price in one market due to the arrival of new information should introduce 
simultaneous and/or lagged changes in prices to the other market. As a result, return and/or 
volatility could be transferred between markets via the flow of information.  Therefore, research 
on such transfer effects can provide useful insight into how information is transmitted and 
disseminated between these markets.  
The majority of empirical studies on return and volatility transfer effects between 
American Depository Receipts (ADRs) and their underlying stocks focus on a single country. 
This paper aims to provide a more comprehensive cross-country study on these transfer effects. 
Moreover, we hypothesize that investment restrictions that impede trading will hinder 
information transfer while those promoting trading will facilitate it. Country- and firm-specific 
attributes that reflect trading barriers and information asymmetry encountered by investors 
should have an impact on the information transmission which in turn leads to return and/or 
volatility transfer(s). This study should also provide some implications for cross-border 
information transfer.  
We find that, after controlling for the U.S. equity, home equity and home currency 
market returns, the extent of home market developments increases the bi-directional return 
transfer and the volatility transfer from the ADRs to their underlying stocks. Disclosure 
requirement increases the return transfer from the ADRs to their underlying stocks and the 
volatility transfer in the opposite direction. Shareholders’ ability to sue officers and directors for 
misconduct lowers the return transfer in both directions and the volatility transfer from the ADRs 
to their underlying stocks. Institutional ownership lowers the volatility transfer from the ADRs to 
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their underlying stocks. Noise trader risk lowers the return transfer from the underlying stocks to 
the ADRs and the volatility transfer from ADRs to their underlying stocks. Synchronicity lowers 
the return transfer from ADRs to their underlying stocks but increases it in the opposite direction. 
It also increases the bi-directional volatility transfer. Proportion of trading in the U.S. increases 
the return transfer from ADRs to their underlying stocks. Market liquidity increases the return 
transfers but lowers the volatility transfer from the ADRs to their underlying stocks. Overall, the 
results are largely consistent with our hypotheses that barriers to trading and investments affect 
the transfer of information across borders. 
  The rest of this essay is organized as follows: Section 1.3 gives a review of the previous 
studies on return and volatility spillover or transfer effects among stock markets, with particular 
focus on those between the markets for ADRs and their underlying stocks. Section 1.4 contains a 
detailed explanation of the hypotheses to be tested.  Section 1.5 provides a description of the 
methodologies. Section 1.6 describes the data sources and sample construction. This is followed 
by Section 1.7 on the empirical results and related discussions. Concluding remarks are given in  
Section 1.8. 
 
1.3 Literature Review 
Most of the studies on the transmission of information in terms of return and volatility 
spillover or transfer effects utilize data from a few national markets. Among them are Eun and 
Shim (1989), Hamao, Masulis and Ng (1990), Ito and Lin (1993), Theodossiou and Lee (1993), 
Lin, Engle and Ito (1994), King, Sentana and Wadhwani (1994), Karolyi (1995), Brailsford 
(1996) and Su and Tsai (1996), Liu and Pan (1997),  Wang and Firth (2004), Balasubramanyan 
(2004), Bala and Premaratne (2004), Johansson and Ljungwall (2006),  Pascual-Fuster and 
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Perez-Rodriquez (2006). These studies, as summarized in Table 1.1, apply different variations of 
the Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedascity (GARCH) and/or Vector 
Autoregressive (VAR) models on developed markets such as U.S., U.K., Japan and Germany 
and more recently on emerging markets including China, Korea, Taiwan and Thailand.  Their 
major findings are:  (i) bi/multi-lateral spillovers are observed in some international stock 
markets, (ii) significant return and volatility spillovers are found from the U.S. or Japan markets 
to the other national stock markets and (iii) volatility spillovers are stronger from the larger 
(dominant) markets to the relatively smaller ones, (iv) return and volatility spillover effects are 
time varying. Although the movements of the markets are highly correlated, covariance between 
their returns largely cannot be explained by economic factors such as interest rates, exchange 
rates and the real money supply.
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Table 1.1 Selected Studies on Return and Volatility Spillover Effects on National Stock Markets 
Study Model Selection Sample Countries Sample Period Major Findings 
Eun and Shim 
(1989) 
VAR The world’s 9 
largest stock 
markets (including 
Australia, Canada, 
etc.) 
Dec 31, 1979 to 
Dec 20, 1985 
• Substantial amount of multi-lateral 
interaction occurs among national stock 
markets. 
• Innovations in the U.S. are rapidly 
transmitted to other markets whereas no 
single foreign market can significantly 
explain the U.S. market movements 
Hamao, Masulis and 
Ng (1990) 
MA(1) -GARCH 
(1,1) 
U.S., U.K. and 
Japan 
Apr 1985 to Mar 
1988 
• Volatility spillover was seen significant in 
U.S.-U.K before the 1987 crash whereas in 
all sample countries after the crash.   
Ito and Lin (1993) Signal extraction 
model with time 
varying variance 
Tokyo and New 
York 
Oct 1985 to Dec 
1991 
• Price information transmission of stocks 
between Tokyo and New York is a result of 
volatility surges rather than trading volume 
surges.  
Theodossiou and 
Lee (1993) 
Multivariate 
GARCH-M 
U.S., Canada, Japan, 
U.K. and Germany 
1980 to 1991 • Significant stock return and volatility 
spillover effects among the 5 countries, to a 
different extent between different pairs of 
countries 
• U.S. market returns spillover to U.K., 
Canada and Germany 
• Japan market returns spillover to Germany 
• U.S. market volatility to the other four 
markets, U.K. only to Canada and Germany 
to Japan 
Lin, Engle and Ito 
(1994) 
A signal extraction 
model with GARCH 
process 
Tokyo and New 
York 
Oct 1, 1985 to Dec, 
29, 1989 
• Bi-directional spillovers between New York 
and Tokyo. 
King, Sentana and 
Wadhwani (1994) 
Multivariate factor 
asset pricing model 
16 national markets Jan 1979 to Oct 
1988 
• Only a small proportion of the covariances 
between markets can be accounted for by 
economic factors such as interest rates, 
exchange rates and the real money supply. 
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Table 1.1. (cont.) 
Study Model Selection Sample Countries Sample Period • Major Findings 
Karolyi (1995) Bivariate GARCH U.S. and Canada Apr 1981 to Dec 
1989 
• Towards the end of the 80s, the impact of 
U.S. market volatility on Canada gradually 
died down. 
Brailsford (1996) GJR-GARCH Australia and New 
Zealand 
Jan 1974 to Sep 
1991 
• Volatility surprises in the larger Australian 
market influence the subsequent conditional 
volatility of smaller New Zealand market 
and the other way round 
Su and Tsai (1996) MA(1)-
GARCH(1,1) 
Japan, Korea, 
Singapore, Hong 
Kong and Taiwan 
Jan 1982 to Dec 
1993 
• Significant return and volatility spillover 
between Japan and Taiwan before the 1987 
crash whereas the two types of spillover 
occur among all the five markets after the 
crash. 
• Results suggests the markets had a tendency 
to become integrated 
• Findings similar to Hamao, Masulis and Ng 
(1990) 
Liu and Pan (1997) ARMA(1,1), 
GARCH(1,1)-M 
U.S., Japan, Hong 
Kong, Singapore, 
Taiwan and 
Thailand  
1984 to 1991 • Index returns and volatility spillover effects 
intensify over time after the 1987 crash, in 
particular U.S. market has a more 
remarkable impact on the Asian stock 
markets than does Japan 
Wang and Firth 
(2004)  
Univariate GARCH Greater China, 
Japan, U.S. and U.K. 
1994 to 2001 • The overnight returns on all the Greater 
China stock indices can be estimated by 
using information from at least one of the 
three developed markets’ daytime returns.  
• The contemporaneous return spillovers are 
in general unidirectional from more 
advanced major international markets to the 
Chinese markets 
Balasubramanyan 
(2004) 
DCC-GARCH 
(Dynamic 
Conditional 
Correlation-
GARCH) 
U.S., U.K. and Japan Jan 2, 1984 to Jul 
22, 2004 
• Statistically significant spillover and 
comovement between U.S., U.K. and Japan  
• Financial markets and their assets are both 
statistically economically related   
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Table 1.1. (cont.) 
Study Model Selection Sample Countries Sample Period • Major Findings 
Bala and Premaratne 
(2004) 
Univariate GARCH 
and Multivariate and 
Asymmetric 
Multivariate 
GARCH 
U.S., U.K., Hong 
Kong, Japan and 
Singapore 
1992 to 2002 • A high degree of co-movement between the 
Singapore stock market and the stock 
markets of Hong Kong, U.S. and U.K. (in 
that order). 
• Small but significant volatility spillover 
from Singapore into Hong Kong, Japan and 
U.S. despite the latter three are dominant 
markets. 
Johansson and 
Ljungwall (2006) 
Multivariate 
EGARCH 
Greater China region 
(Mainland China, 
Hong Kong and 
Taiwan) 
1994 to 2005  • Both China and Hong Kong are affected by 
mean spillover from Taiwan while Hong 
Kong and Taiwan show signs of feedback 
relationship in their volatility process.  
• Mainland China market is much less 
interdependent with the other two markets 
whereas Hong Kong show clear bi-
directional spillover effects. 
Pascual-Fuster and 
Perez-Rodriquez 
(2006) 
VAR-GARCH U.S., Japan and 
Europe (either 
London/Frankfurt) 
Dec 12, 1996 to 
Dec 12, 2000 
• Higher volatility transmission from Japan to 
the foreign markets (U.S. or European) for 
Japanese firms with significant business 
activity in the foreign market’s time zone 
geographical area. Weaker empirical 
evidence of higher transmission from the 
foreign markets to Japan for Japanese firms 
with fewer business interests in these 
market’s time zone geographical area. 
8 
 
Recently, more research attention is paid to the interrelationship between ADRs and their 
underlying stocks or home market index. This research includes but is not limited to studies on 
information transmission in terms of return and volatility transfers between ADRs and their 
underlying stocks. Park (1995) examines the variance of ADR returns and provides evidence that 
while information about the price of the underlying stock can largely explain the variability in 
ADR returns, trading noises also affect ADR volatilities.  By using a Vector Error Correction 
(VECM) Model and some VAR Models to analyze the dynamic relationships between ADRs and 
home market portfolios, Jiang (1998) documents that interrelationships exist between 
international markets. He is able to demonstrate that ADRs are in general affected by their 
respective home market index whereas the reverse effect depends on the degree of cointegration 
between markets. Additionally, U.S. equity market returns and currency market returns are 
significantly correlated with the ADR returns.    
Several other studies, outlined below, examine the return and volatility transfer between 
ADRs and their underlying stocks. However, none of them analyzes the role of investment 
restrictions in the process of information resolution. Hauser, Tanchuama and Yarri (1998) 
investigate Israel stocks that are listed on both the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange and NASDAQ 
using Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) and VAR models. They find that 
price changes in the U.S. are strongly affected by those changes in Israel that occurred earlier the 
same day. On the other hand, the impact in the opposite direction is considerably weaker. 
Alaganar and Bhar (2001) apply a similar VAR model to examine the direction and magnitude of 
information flow between Australian ADRs and their underlying stocks. They find that ADR 
market is in general informationally efficient and follows the law of one price.  Chen, Chou and 
Yang (2002) investigate the Granger causality between Taiwan ADRs or GDRs (Global 
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Depositary Receipts) and their respective underlying stocks. Their result suggests that there is a 
unidirectional causality from Taiwan to the foreign markets; additionally prices in both markets 
are consistent with a long run co-integrated equilibrium. A relatively more comprehensive study 
is given by Yang, Doong, Wang and Chang (2005). They apply a GARCH model to investigate 
the intra-day return and volatility transfer effects between ADRs and their underlying stocks in 
Japan, Taiwan, Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore. They find that the return transfers are bi-
directional, with stronger effect from the underlying stocks to their ADRs than those in the 
opposite direction. On the other hand, the volatility transfers are unidirectional from the 
underlying stocks to ADRs only. Like Chen, Chou and Yang (2002) and consistent with the 
related literature on entire national markets, this evidence implies that home market is acting as 
the dominant market while the foreign market is a satellite. The findings in these studies are also 
consistent with Park (1995), in that the variance of ADR returns decline by more than half on the 
home market exchange holidays when there is no trade possible for the underlying stocks than on 
ordinary days.  Nevertheless, none of these studies has presented an explanation on why the 
strength of such transfer effects might differ across countries.   
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1.4 Hypotheses 
 
In this essay, we present six hypotheses, with all  based on the idea of exploring how 
market-based factors (market development associated restrictions, short sell restrictions, and 
investor protection), information-based factors (insider ownership, institutional ownership, noise 
trader risks and synchronicity with home market returns) and trading-based factors (proportion of 
trading in U.S. and market liquidity of the issuing firm’s stock) affect the return and volatility 
transfers between ADRs and their underlying stocks.  
 
Hypothesis 1:  
The higher the degree of trading barriers1, the higher the return and volatility 
transfer effects between ADRs and their underlying stocks.  
Investors trading in securities of less developed countries are likely to 
encounter more investment restrictions than those trading in securities of more 
developed countries. In particular, trading in the less developed countries can be 
limited due to impediments arising from market frictions and imperfect 
information. It is expected that the greater the home market investment restriction, 
the lower the transfer effects. 
 
                                                 
1 Whereas ADRs of most countries can be issued or cancelled at any time (i.e. a ‘two-way market”), ADRs of some 
countries such as Korea, Taiwan and India have some restrictions on their issuance. In these markets, common 
shares are subject to limitations when converted to ADRs after sale of the ADRs and the subsequent cancellation. 
There is a limit on how many common shares can be deposited. Under the circumstances when the limit is reached, 
the ADRs will be closed for re-issuance. Other markets that have different forms of restricted country accessibility 
are Egypt and Pakistan (both have risky settlement procedures), Venezuela (control the movement of capital), Italy 
(difficult to reclaim local taxes due on the purchase of local shares), Brazil, U.K. and Japan (difficult to transfer 
taxes due on the purchase of local shares). While most of the restrictions affect the trading of underlying stock only, 
some of them might affect the trading of ADRs as well. See JP Morgans (2008) and Citigroup(2005) for more detail. 
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Hypothesis 2: 
The greater the investor protection in the home market, the higher the return and 
volatility transfer between ADRs and their underlying stocks.  
Investors may be less willing to trade ADRs if they find that the laws 
protecting the public investors from corporate insiders are relatively weak. As 
such, relatively lower investor protection in a country should hinder trading 
activities. We expect greater home market investor protection will lead to higher 
transfer effects.  
 
Hypothesis 3: 
The greater the institutional ownership of the underlying stock, the higher the 
expected transfer effect, assuming that institutional holdings reduce information 
asymmetry. Insider holding is expected to reduce the transfer effects. 
If institutional ownership is high, information asymmetry is possibly lower 
[Merton (1987)]. As lower information asymmetry will induce more market depth 
and ease of trading, we would expect institutional ownership being positively 
related to return and volatility transfers between ADRs and underlying stocks. On 
the other hand, investors likely would avoid trading in stocks with high 
information asymmetry between corporate insiders and outside shareholders. If 
insider ownership is higher, information asymmetry is likely higher, which in turn 
lowers the effectiveness of transfer.  
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Hypothesis 4: 
Noise trader risk is negatively related to the return and volatility transfers between 
ADRs and their underlying stocks.  
Noise traders are those who trade on their own erroneous beliefs. At times, 
they can affect prices and can earn higher expected returns. However, the 
unpredictability of their beliefs might create a risk for other investors, especially 
short-term traders [DeLong, Shleifer, Summers and Waldman (1989, 1990) and 
Shlifer and Vishny (1997)]. As a result, short-term traders might not be able to 
estimate with a reasonable degree of certainty the extent by which the market 
price would diverge from its fundamental value. This increases their trading risk 
thus lower the extent of transfer. 
 
Hypothesis 5: 
The greater the synchronicity of the underlying stock’s price movement with the 
home equity market performance, the greater the transfer effect.  
Idiosyncratic risk can also be estimated by one minus the fraction of the 
variation of stock returns relative to the market return (i.e. 1- R2 of regressing a 
stock’s return on the market return [Roll (1988), Morck, Yeung and Yu (2000), 
Barberis, Shleifer and Wurgle (2002)]). 2  Relatively higher R2 stocks (highly 
synchronized with home equity market movement and thus have less idiosyncratic 
risk) are subject to less information asymmetry. The higher the R2 of the 
underlying stock, the greater the liquidity, leading to stronger transfer effects. 
                                                 
2 Alternatively, in market microstructure literature, noise traders are sometimes thought of as liquidity traders. 
Liquidity traders might actually help arbitrage, since the existence of liquidity traders means a deeper market.  
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Hypothesis 6: 
Market liquidity of issuing firm’s stocks increases the return and volatility 
transfer between the ADRs and their underlying stocks. 
Investors are likely more able to trade on their information, in terms of 
extent and timeliness, when the securities are more liquid. Therefore, market 
liquidity of the issuing firm’s securities is expected to be positively related to 
return and volatility transfers between ADRs and underlying stocks.  
 
1.5  Methodologies 
 
Daily returns of the ADRs and their underlying stocks are calculated as in the following.  
)P/Pln(R 1t,it,it,i −=  -----------------------(1) 
where  t,iR is the return of ADR i/underlying stock i from day t-1 to day t 
t,iP and 1t,iP − are the prices of ADR i/underlying stock i on day t and day t-1 
respectively. 
The returns are then fitted into an MA(1)-GARCH (1,1)-M model [Bollerslev(1987), 
French, Schwert, and Stambaugh(1987), Hamao, Masulis and Ng (1990), Wang, Rui and Firth 
(2002)] to study whether the return and volatility transfer effects between the ADRs and their 
underlying stocks are significant. Due to the nonsynchronous trading in the ADRs and their 
underlying stocks, it is highly likely that their returns include a small, short-lived serial 
correlation. Incorporating a first-order moving average, MA(1), in the conditional return 
equation will help to control for this problem [Hamao, Masulis and Ng (1990)]. 
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The corresponding MA(1)-GARCH (1,1)-M  model is given in the following.  
ADR
t,i
ADR
1t,i3
ADR
t,i2
UDL
t,i10
ADR
t,i hRR ε+εα+α+α+α= − ,  ( )ADRt,i1tADRt,i h,0N~| −Ωε , 
( ) ( ) ADR1t32ADR1t,i22UDLt,i10ADRt,i haa)aaexp(h −− +ε+ε+= -----------------------(2) 
UDL
t,i
UDL
1t,i3
UDL
t,i2
ADR
t,i10
UDL
t,i hRR ε+εβ+β+β+β= − ,  ( )UDLt,i1tUDLt,i h,0N~| −Ωε , 
( ) ( ) UDL1t32UDL1t,i22ADRt,i10UDLt,i hbb)bbexp(h −− +ε+ε+= -----------------------(3) 
where   
ADR
t,iR = daily return of ADR i  from day t-1 to day t 
UDL
t,iR = daily return of ADR i’s underlying stock from day t-1 to day t 
ADR
t,ih = conditional return volatility of ADR i of day t 
UDL
t,ih = conditional return volatility of ADR i’s underlying stock of day t  
ADR
t,iε = the return residuals of ADR i of day t 
UDL
t,iε = the return residuals of ADR i’s underlying stock of day t 
1−Ωt = the information set observed by investors in day t-1 
 
Following Judge et. al (1985), the functional form of the multiplicative heteroscedasticity 
used in the above model is exponential instead of linear as in Hamao, Masulis and Ng (1990) and 
Wang, Rui and Firth (2002). The advantage of using an exponential form in the conditional 
variance is that it helps eliminating the possibility of negative variance.     
For the markets with few trading barriers, if the estimates of the coefficients,  1α  and 1β  
are significantly different from zero (i.e. rejecting 0,0:H 110 =β=α ), then the return of an 
ADR and that of its underlying stock can be interpreted to be affected by  each other. Similarly, 
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if the estimates of the coefficients, 1a and 1b , are significantly different from zero (i.e. rejecting 
0b,0a:H 110 == ), then the volatility of an ADR and that of its underlying stock can be 
interpreted to have some impact on each other.  
The significant transfer effects (i.e. the significant estimates of 1α , 1β , 1a and 1b obtained 
in (2) and (3) above) are then regressed on the variable proxies for investment restrictions, 
investor protection, ownership structure, noise trader risk, synchronicity, proportion of trading in 
U.S., and the market liquidity of the issuing firm’s stocks as in the following regression model. 
  
( ) ii132ADRi12
ADR
i11
2
i10i9i8i7
H
i6
H
i5
H
i4
H
i3
H
i2
H
i1i
)MCAP(Ln%
%RnalInstitutioInsideritShdhlderSu
abDirectorLiDisclosurecetanDisShortSell)PCGNI(LnTransfer
ε+γ+τγ+
τγ+γ+σγ+γ+γ+γ+
γ+γ+γ+γ+γ+ϕ=
ε
       
-----------------------(4) 
where  iTransfer is return/volatility transfer effect (significant at least at 5% level) 
   between an ADR and its underlying stock 
H
i)PCGNI(LN is the logarithm of average per-capita home market GNI from 2003  
 to 2006. This serves as a proxy for the extent of development of the  
 home equity market 
 HiShortSell is a dummy variable equals 1 if investors are allowed to short sell  
  shares and  they also practice shortselling in the home market   
and 0 otherwise  
H
icetanDis is the number of miles separating a given country’s main stock 
 exchange from New York 
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H
iDisclosure is the average of the home market Disclosure Index (transparency of  
 transaction) level of 2006 and 2007 
H
iabDirectorLi  is the average of the home market Director Liability Index  
 (liability for self-dealing) level of 2006 and 2007 
 HiShdhldSuit is the average of the home market ease of Shareholder Suit Index 
 (shareholders’ ability to sue officers and directors for misconduct) 
 level of 2006 and 2007.  
iInsider is the insider ownership of the issuing firm of the ADR i and its 
 underlying stock as at the end of 2007 
inalInstitutio is the institutional ownership of the issuing firm of the ADR i and its  
 underlying stock as at the end of 2007 
iεσ is the average of the standard deviation of the international market model  
 return residuals of the underlying stock and that of the ADR of the  
 issuer i3. This variable is used as a proxy for the aggregate noise trader 
 risk. 
                                                 
3Gagnon and Karolyi (2004) use the standard deviation of the return residuals of the international market model of 
the home shares. Since the standard deviation of return residuals of the international market model is quite different 
between the ADRs and home shares, therefore, this paper uses the average of the two to represent the noise trader 
risk.    
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2
iR is a firm-level measure of synchronicity or common co-movements in the 
stock prices. It is estimated by the adjusted coefficient of  
determination of the market model regressing the underlying stock returns  
on the home market returns for each sample firm. High value indicates 
little firm-specific information can be capitalized into the stock price  
changes 
ADR
i%τ measures the proportion of trading in U.S. It is the percentage of an  
issuing firm’s aggregate turnover traded in the form of ADRs in New York. 
[ ( )2ADRi%τ  is added to capture the non-linear effects in the regression as in 
Gagnon and Karolyi (2004)]. 
 i)MCAP(Ln is the logarithm of the average of issuing firm i’s stock market 
capitalization of 2003 and 2006. This is used as a firm-specific proxy for  
market liquidity  
 
Like Hamao, Masulis and Ng (1999), observations with missing data either in ADRs or 
their underlying stocks due to the close of exchanges will be excluded from the data points.  
Hamao, Masulis and Ng (1999) claim that this method of handling nonsynchronous trading 
among different markets does not affect the reliability of the results.  
In the Regression Model (4) above, Gross National Income (GNI)4 per capita is used to 
proxy market development. That is, home market based restrictions are measured by the 
logarithm of GNI of home market. Moreover, we investigate how two other market-based 
restrictions on investors, namely short-sales restriction (Bris, Geotzmann and Zhu (2007)) and 
                                                 
4Previously known as GNP, however, since 2001, the World Bank refers to the GNP as the GNI.  
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distance from U.S., both of which might slow down information-trading, which in turn influence 
the transfer effects. However, instead of using time zone to measure the distance, we use the 
actual mileage. With the asymmetric treatment of short sales in the ADR and home markets, the 
deviations from price parity are less likely to dissipate quickly. It is because investors in 
countries with short sales restrictions may not be able to trade and incorporate the relevant 
information into the prices in a timely manner. The distance between the home market and U.S. 
(measured by the number of miles that separate the U.S. and home markets) may also affect the 
ability of information traders to force the convergence of ADR and home market prices. This is 
because the farther apart two markets are, the more difficult investors might have in accessing 
one market from the other. The value of disclosure index, director liability index and the value of 
ease of shareholder suit index of home market are jointly used to proxy for the home market 
investor protection. The underlying stock’s market capitalization is taken as the firm-specific 
proxy for its market liquidity. To estimate the proportion of trading in U.S., we compute the 
percentage of the ADR issuing firm’s aggregate turnover traded in the U.S. for each ADR-
underlying stock. For the estimation of the noise trader risk, we take the average of standard 
deviation of the international market model’s residuals of the ADRs and that of their underlying 
stocks. The variable R2 is the adjusted R2 obtained when the underlying stock returns are 
regressed on home market returns. 
 
1.6 Data and Sample Description 
 
Data concerning ADRs are drawn from the adr.com website (http://www.adr.com) which 
is a joint project run by JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. ("JPMorgan") and Thomson Financial. 
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Detailed information such as ADR name, ticker, listed exchange, level, industry, country, 
underlying stock ticker, underlying stock exchange, ratio of ADR to ordinary share and effective 
date can be obtained from their ADR universe. The sample is cross-checked with the depository 
universes of Citigroup and Bank of New York as well as the databases of Compustat and 
Security Data Company (SDC). Daily close prices of the matching pairs of ADRs and their 
underlying stocks, home equity market indexes and U.S. equity market daily close values are 
downloaded from the Yahoo Finance website or Reuters Data Link. Returns of world market 
index (S&P Global 1200 Stock Issues), which is used in the international market model for 
estimating the noise trader risks, are obtained from Reuters Data Link. Daily close foreign 
exchange rates are obtained from Reuters Data Link. Values of the investor protection indexes 
and per capita GNI are downloaded from the World Bank Group website 
(http://www.doingbusiness.org).  Short sell data are extracted from Bris, Geotzmann, and Zhu 
(2007). Mileage information is obtained from the WebFlyer website 
(http://www.webflyer.com/travel/milemaker/getmileage.php). Ownership structures of the ADR 
issuers and their market capitalization are downloaded from the MSN Money website 
(http://moneycentral.msn.com/ownership) and obtained from Compustat respectively.     
Only ADRs of Level II (non-capital raising) and Level III (capital raising) are included in 
the sample since they are listed on one of the major stock exchanges in U.S. and are subject to 
similar regulations from the SEC. The sample period spans from January 2003 to December 
2007, i.e. the post Sarbanes-Oxley Act era.  The sample includes 145 ADR-underlying stock 
pairs listed on U.S. stock exchanges and the stock exchanges of 25 countries.  Some descriptive 
summary on the sample is displayed in Table 1.2 and Table 1.3.  
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Table 1.2 shows the sample distribution from various countries and regions. Among the 
countries, U.K. (24) has the most ADR-underlying stock pairs whereas Belgium, Finland, Greece, 
Indonesia, Portugal and Sweden each have only one pair. In terms of overall investor protection, 
Hong Kong (8.9) scores the highest while Greece (3) and Switzerland (3) are ranked the lowest. 
Norway (with average GNI per capita of US$56,850) is deemed to be the wealthiest country 
whereas India (with average GNI per capita of $678) the poorest among the countries in the 
sample. All the countries in the sample except Indonesia, South Korea and Greece allow for 
short-selling in security trading. However, investors in Argentina, Brazil, Finland, India, Israel 
and Spain do not practice short-selling even though there is no such restriction in these markets.  
Being the furthest market away from U.S., Indonesia is about 10,000 miles from New York. 
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Table 1.2 Country Characteristics of the American Depository Receipts (ADRs) and Underlying Stock Pairs 
This table reports the country characteristics of the ADR-underlying stock pairs. The countries are grouped under 5 regions. Country values of the 
investor protection indices and GNI per capita are downloaded from the World Bank Group website. Short-sell restrictions and practices data are 
extracted from Bris, Goetzmann and Zhu (2007). Information on mileage is downloaded from the WebFlyer website. Regional mean shows the 
country average of the values of the variables in the region.    
 
Country 
Number 
of ADR-
UDL 
Pairs 
Mean Investor Protection (2006&2007) Mean GNI 
Per Capita 
(2003 - 2006, 
US$) 
Short-Sell Restriction 
(Practiced) 
Distance from 
New York 
(miles) 
Disclosure 
Index 
Director 
Liability 
Index 
Shareholder 
Suits Index 
Investor 
Protection 
Index 
Asia Develop                
 Australia 7 8 2 7 5.7 29,900 No (Yes) 9,935 
 Hong Kong 14 10 8 8.5 8.9 27,603 No (Yes) 8,050 
 Japan 17 7 6 8 7 36,918 No (Yes) 6,750 
 
Regional 
mean 8.3 5.3 7.8 7.2 31,473  6,130 
         
Asia Emerging         
 India 5 7 4 7 6 678 No (No) 7,780 
 Indonesia 1 9 5 3 5.7 1,178 Yes (No) 10,000 
 South Korea 6 7 2 7 5.3 14,915 Yes (No) 6,870 
 
Regional 
mean 7.7 3.7 5.7 5.7 5,590  7,510 
         
Europe Develop         
 Belgium 1 8 6 7 7 33,165 No (Yes) 3,650 
 Finland 1 6 4 7 5.7 35,305 No (No) 4,100 
 France 8 10 1 5 5.3 31,830 No (Yes) 3,620 
 Germany 3 5 5 5 5 31,980 No (Yes) 3,840 
 Greece 1 1 3 5 3 22,688 Yes (No) 4,920 
 Ireland 6 10 6 9 8.3 37,445 No (Yes) 3,170 
 Italy 2 7 4 6 5.7 27,793 No (Yes) 3,980 
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Table 1.2 (cont.) 
 
Country 
Number 
of ADR-
UDL 
Pairs 
Mean Investor Protection (2006&2007) Mean GNI 
Per Capita 
(2003 - 2006, 
US$) 
Short-Sell Restriction 
(Practiced) 
Distance from 
New York 
(miles) 
Disclosure 
Index 
Director 
Liability 
Index 
Shareholder 
Suits Index 
Investor 
Protection 
Index 
 Netherlands 2 4 4 6 4.7 36,720 No (Yes) 3,630 
 Norway 2 7 6 7 6.7 56,850 No (Yes) 3,670 
 Portugal 1 6 5 7 6 15,683 No (Yes) 3,360 
 Spain 3 5 6 4 5 22,968 No (No) 3,580 
 Sweden 1 3 4 7 5 37,450 No (Yes) 3,910 
 Switzerland 4 0 5 4 3 51,570 No (Yes) 3,920 
 U.K. 24 10 7 7 8 35,325 No (Yes) 3,440 
  
Regional 
mean 5.9 4.7 6.1 5.6     34,055  3,575 
         
Latin America         
 Argentina 8 6 2 6 4.7 4,215 No (No) 5,300 
 Brazil 6 6 7 3 5.3 3,715 No (No) 4,760 
 Mexico 13 7 2.5 5 4.9 7,108 No (Yes)  2,090 
 
Regional 
mean 6.3 3.8 4.7 5.0 5,013  3,634 
Middle East/Africa        
 Israel 5 7 9 9 8.3 18,648 No (No) 5,660 
 South Africa 4 8 8 8 8 4,175 No (Yes) 7,970 
  
Regional 
mean 7.5 8.5 8.5 8.2 11,412  6,686 
          
 United States - 7 9 9 8.3 41580 No (Yes) - 
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As expected, the developed regions have on average larger firm sizes, almost triple those 
of the firms in the emerging Asian markets and about five times as much as the Latin American 
and Middle East/African firms. Latin American firms have more concentrated ownerships, on 
average over 60% of the company shares are held by insiders whereas less than 30% insider 
ownership is found in the firms in all the other regions. On the other hand, Table 1.3 seems to 
suggest that institutional investors have more interest in investing in Latin American (hold, on 
average, 28.2% of the firms) and Middle East/African firms (hold, on average, 22.1% of the 
firms). ADRs are on average subject to less noise trader risk than their underlying stocks in all 
regions. The greatest differences exist in the Latin American and Middle East/African firms. The 
underlying stocks in developed regions have a relatively higher degree of comovements with 
their home market index performance, in other words, less idiosyncratic risk; this contradict 
Morck, Yeung and Yu (2000) finding that emerging markets have greater R2. Comparing the 
trading of ADRs and their underlying stocks, ADR trading tends to be greater in the emerging 
Asian markets. This could suggest that investors are much interested in the emerging Asian 
markets but might not have easy access to these markets or not having enough confidence in the 
country regulations of this region with respect to investments. As such, the only alternative left 
to the investors is investing in the ADRs of these countries.        
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Table 1.3 Some Statistics About the ADR-Underlying Stock Pairs 
This table reports the company characteristics of the ADR-underlying stock pairs. The countries are grouped under 5 regions. Firm market 
capitalization is obtained from Compustat. Insider ownership and institutional ownership are downloaded from the MSN Money website. Noise 
trader risk is estimated as the standard deviation of the international market model’s residuals. R2 is the adjusted R2 of the regression of the 
underlying stock’s returns on the corresponding home market returns. % trading in ADR is estimated as the fraction of the aggregate trading 
revenues in ADRs over the sample period.     
 
Country 
Number 
of ADR-
UDL 
Pairs 
Mean Market 
Capitalization of 
Issuing Firms 
(US$ Millions) 
Mean % of 
Insider 
Ownership 
Mean % of 
Institutional 
Ownership 
Mean Noise 
Trader Risk 
in ADR 
Mean Noise 
Trader Risk 
in UDL Mean R2 
Mean % 
Trading in 
ADR 
Asia Develop          
 Australia 7 12,356 6.6 3.7 .020 .020 .267 9.0 
 Hong Kong 14 10,993 52.0 6.3 .026 .027 .307 24.3 
 Japan 17 32,998 16.4 5.1 .016 .019 .365 75.8 
  38 21,089 27.7 5.3 .021 .022 .325 44.5 
         
Asia Emerging         
 India 5 6,941 19.0 15.1 .023 .034 .163 96.3 
 Indonesia 1 2,416 55.0 2.65 .021 .052 .039 97.7 
 South Korea 6 13,177 20.0 15.0 .025 .021 .303 81.9 
  12 9,682 22.5 14.0 .024 .029 .225 89.1 
         
Europe Develop         
 Belgium 1 5,413 1.0 1.8 .019 .018 .256 91.7 
 Finland 1 77,570 1.0 19.8 .017 .019 .843 98.1 
 France 8 30,759 26.6 6.0 .016 .017 .378 41.9 
 Germany 3 49,000 4.7 7.5 .014 .015 .459 97.9 
 Greece 1 8,723 51.0 .5 .021 .017 .015 74.4 
 Ireland 6 7,520 6.4 37.3 .028 .031 .229 96.5 
 Italy 2 52,242 52.5 3.2 .011 .013 .360 10.7 
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Table 1.3 (cont.) 
 
        
Country 
Number 
of ADR-
UDL 
Pairs 
Mean Market 
Capitalization of 
Issuing Firms 
(US$ Millions) 
Mean % of 
Insider 
Ownership 
Mean % of 
Institutional 
Ownership 
Mean Noise 
Trader Risk 
in ADR 
Mean Noise 
Trader Risk 
in UDL Mean R2 
Mean % 
Trading in 
ADR 
          
 Netherlands 2 14,507 23.0 2.6 .020 .021 .174 50.2 
 Norway 2 20,123 36.0 9.3 .026 .027 .448 89.7 
 Portugal 1 12,359 27.0 4.2 .014 .013 .122 77.4 
 Spain 3 50,722 14.3 1.7 .011 .013 .523 2.8 
 Sweden 1 41,119 1.0 7.4 .022 .024 .453 94.9 
 Switzerland 4 49,036 4.5 7.7 .015 .015 .430 10.3 
 U.K. 24 43,296 2.2 9.6 .014 .015 .328 1.1 
  59 36,348 11.6 10.6 .016 .018 .349 34.2 
 
Latin America         
 Argentina 8 3,362 72.3 15.0 .026 .040 .157 7.9 
 Brazil 6 3,367 54.1 37.9 .026 .032 .227 38.8 
 Mexico 13 5,466 65.2 31.8 .021 .051 .208 72.6 
  27 4,376 64.8 28.2 .023 .044 .198 45.9 
         
Middle East/Africa         
 Israel 5 4,517 33.0 23.6 .025 .041 .171 2.8 
 South Africa 4 9,392 20.8 20.4 .024 .051 .048 50.0 
    9 6,684 27.6 22.1 .024 .045 .117 23.8 
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1.7 Empirical Results and Discussions 
 
Although not reported here, Engle’s LM Test for the presence of autoregressive 
conditional heteroskedasticity shows that the daily close-to-close returns of all the ADRs and 
their underlying stocks in the sample have ARCH effects up to 12 lags. This justifies the use of a 
GARCH model to analyze the return and volatility transfers. From Table 1.4, it can be seen that 
the ADRs and their underlying stocks in the sample on average have a small serial correlation 
thus it is appropriate to include MA(1) in the conditional return of the GARCH-in-mean model 
[Hamao, Masulis and Ng (1990)].  
ADRs on average have a higher mean daily return than that of their underlying stocks. In 
particular, emerging Asian ADRs’ mean daily return is considerably higher than that of their 
underlying stocks. Regarding standard deviation of returns, the Asian (both developed and 
emerging) and European subsamples are about the same between home and ADR shares. On the 
other hand, the underlying stocks are on average about 70% and 260% more volatile than their 
ADRs in the Latin American and Middle East/African subsamples respectively. These results 
seem to suggest that pricing differ across markets, even for the same underlying firms.     
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Table 1.4 Summary Statistics of the Daily Return Distribution of the ADRs and Underlying Stock Pairs 
This table shows the mean, standard deviation and the serial correlation of the daily returns estimated from the prices downed from Yahoo Finance 
and Reuters Data Link. 
    
  
Mean (%)  Std. Dev. (%)     Serial Correlation 
Country ADR 
Underlying 
Stock  ADR 
Underlying 
Stock   ADR 
Underlying 
Stock 
Asia Develop            
 Australia 7 .08 .04  2.24 2.03   -.027 -.033 
 Hong Kong 14 .15 .14  2.83 2.75   -.054 .020 
 Japan 17 .06 .05  1.84 1.95   -.016 .006 
  38 .09 .08  2.28 2.39   -.032 .004 
            
Asia Emerging           
 India 5 .13 .02  2.55 3.42   -.016 .010 
 Indonesia 1 .14 .006  2.33 5.21   .006 -.042 
 South Korea 6 .05 .04  2.72 2.13   -.043 .010 
  12 .09 .02  2.61 2.85   -.023 .006 
            
Europe Develop           
 Belgium 1 .14 .11  2.00 1.91   -.028 .022 
 Finland 1 .08 .05  2.09 2.08   .018 .026 
 France 8 .08 .05  1.92 1.87   -.028 .024 
 Germany 3 .07 .04  1.85 1.77   -.023 .023 
 Greece 1 .11 .08  2.18 1.71   -.188 .025 
 Ireland 6 .08 .04  2.91 3.20   .006 -.015 
 Italy 2 .08 .05  1.35 1.41   -.089 -.105 
 Netherlands 2 .20 .17  2.21 2.17   -.027 .003 
 Norway 2 .18 .15  2.80 2.72   -.009 -.026 
 Portugal 1 .08 .03  1.45 1.31   -.112 -.032 
 Spain 3 .09 .09  1.45 1.46   -.066 .012 
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Table 1.4 Cont. 
    
  
Mean (%)  Std. Dev. (%)   Serial Correlation 
Country ADR 
Underlying 
Stock  ADR 
Underlying 
Stock  ADR 
Underlying 
Stock 
           
 Sweden 1 .11 .08  2.67 2.66  .084 .056 
 Switzerland 4 .11 .09  1.75 1.72  -.051 -.003 
 U.K. 24 .08 .05  1.64 1.60  -.066 -.044 
  59 .09 .06  1.90 1.90  -.046 -.017 
           
Latin America          
 Argentina 8 .12 .11  2.69 4.02  .025 -.077 
 Brazil 6 .16 .13  2.84 3.24  .014 .014 
 Mexico 15 .11 .10  2.27 5.23  .046 -.089 
  27 .12 .11  2.52 4.29  .032 -.062 
           
Middle East/Africa          
 Israel 5 .09 .05  2.39 12.12  -.043 -.173 
 South Africa 4 .03 .01  2.58 5.07  -.026 -.323 
  9 .07 .03  2.47 8.98  -.035 -.240 
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The results of the regression analysis are presented in Table 1.5 to Table 1.8. Model 1 
presents the full regression model. Since short sell is highly correlated with Ln(PCGNI) and 
noise trader risk is also highly correlated with synchronicity (See Appendix Table A1.1), these 
variables are not included in the same regression --  Models 2 and 3 present these analyses.  
For the return transfer from ADRs to their underlying stocks (Table 1.5 Models 2 and 3), 
the coefficient of market development is significantly positive.  It makes sense because with 
better market development, investors encounter fewer restrictions. As a result, information can 
be transmitted more easily between markets through their trading. This strongly supports 
Hypothesis 1.  
The coefficient of disclosure is significantly positive.  Greater disclosure requirement 
makes firms report their operation results and material facts in a more accurate and timely 
manner. This will likely remove some of the uncertainties that the investors might have. 
Consequently, they are more willing to trade in the markets with higher disclosure requirement 
than those with lower disclosure requirement, thus leading to more efficient return transfers from 
the ADR market to their underlying stock market. The coefficient of director liability is not 
significant. On the other hand, the coefficient of shareholder suit is significantly negative. This is 
inconsistent with the prediction of Hypothesis 2. The joint results in the investor protection 
partially support Hypothesis 2.  
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Table 1.5 Regression of Return Transfer Effect from ADRs to Underlying Stocks on Market 
Development, Investment Restrictions, Investor Protection, Ownership Structure, Noise 
Trader Risk, Synchronicity, Proportion of Trading in U.S. and Market Liquidity of the 
Issuing Firm’s Stocks 
 
1β  is obtained from the following MA(1)-GARCH(1,1) –M model:  
UDL
t,i
UDL
1t,i3
UDL
t,i2
ADR
t,i10
UDL
t,i hRR ε+εβ+β+β+β= − ,  ( )UDLt,i1tUDLt,i h,0N~| −Ωε , 
( ) ( ) UDL1t32UDL1t,i22ADRt,i10UDLt,i hbb)bbexp(h −− +ε+ε+=  
   Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 
Return Transfer from 
ADR to Underlying 
Stock 
Return Transfer from 
ADR to Underlying 
Stock
Return Transfer from 
ADR to Underlying 
Stock
Dependent Variable 1β   1β   1β  
 Coef.  P>|t| Coef.  P>|t| Coef.  P>|t| 
Independent Variables            
            
Market Development (Ln(PCGNI)) .054*** 0.00 .06*** 0.00 .06*** 0.00 
Short Sell -.01 0.86     
Distance (Miles) -3.84e-09 1.00     
Disclosure .01* 0.08 .01* 0.06 .01* 0.06 
Director Liability .01 0.11 .01 0.11 .01 0.14 
Shareholder Suit -.02* 0.08 -.02** 0.04 -.02** 0.04 
Insider Ownership  .001** 0.04 .001** 0.03 .001* 0.08 
Institutional Ownership 
 
.0004 0.62 .0003 0.66 .001 0.43 
Noise Trader Risk -2.62*** 0.01 -3.02*** 0.00   
Synchronicity (R2) .11 0.20   .17** 0.03 
Proportion of Trading in U.S.  .48*** 0.01 .47*** 0.00 .44*** 0.01 
 -.46*** 0.02 -.46*** 0.01 -.44*** 0.01 
Market Liquidity (Ln(MCAP)) .004 0.66 .01 0.30 .01 0.33 
        
Constant .14 0.48 .14 0.40 .003 0.98 
        
Obs 145  145  145  
Adj. R2 0.26  0.27  0.24  
(*), (**) and (***) indicate the estimate is significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
iεσ
2R
ADRτ%
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The coefficient of insider ownership is significantly positive whereas the coefficient of 
institutional ownership is not significant. These results do not lend any support to Hypothesis 3 
which predicts that the higher the insider ownership, the lower the return transfers.  
The coefficient of noise trader risk is significantly negative. As expected, if the investors 
are short-term traders, they would be less willing to trade in stocks with high noise trader risk. 
The lack of trading, in turn, lowers the return and volatility transfers between the ADRs and their 
underlying stocks. This finding strongly supports the prediction of Hypothesis 4. That is, if the 
investors are mainly short-term traders, they would be hesitated to trade in stocks with great 
noise trader risk. The coefficient of synchronicity is significantly positive. This finding is 
consistent with Hypothesis 5.  
The coefficient of proportion of trading in U.S. is significantly positive. But the 
coefficient of market liquidity is not significant. Thus, the importance of liquidity is not 
conclusive. In addition, the square of proportion of U.S. trading is negative, suggesting that the 
relation between transfer and U.S. trading weakens as the latter gets larger. 
For the return transfer from the underlying stocks to the ADRs, the results are shown in 
Table 1.6, Model 2 and Model 3.  Similar to the return transfer from the ADRs to their 
underlying stocks, the coefficient of shareholder suit is significantly negative. Again this is not 
consistent with Hypothesis 2. Consistent with earlier results, the coefficient of noise trader risk is 
significantly negative while that of synchronicity is significantly positive. Again, the coefficient 
of proportion of trading in U.S. is significantly positive but the coefficient of market liquidity is 
not significant.    
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Table 1.6 Regression of Return Transfer Effect from Underlying Stocks to ADRs on Market 
Development, Investment Restrictions, Investor Protection, Ownership Structure, Noise 
Trader Risk, Synchronicity, Proportion of Trading in U.S. and Market Liquidity of the 
Issuing Firm’s Stocks 
 
1α  is obtained from the following MA(1)-GARCH(1,1)–M model:  
ADR
t,i
ADR
1t,i3
ADR
t,i2
UDL
t,i10
ADR
t,i hRR ε+εα+α+α+α= − ,  ( )ADRt,i1tADRt,i h,0N~| −Ωε , 
( ) ( ) ADR1t32ADR1t,i22UDLt,i10ADRt,i haa)aaexp(h −− +ε+ε+=  
   Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 
Return Transfer from  
Underlying Stock to 
ADR
Return Transfer from  
Underlying Stock to 
ADR
Return Transfer from  
Underlying Stock to 
ADR
Dependent Variable 1α   1α   1α  
 Coef.  P>|t| Coef.  P>|t| Coef.  P>|t| 
Independent Variables            
            
Market Development (Ln(PCGNI)) .02 0.33 .02 0.22 .02 0.20 
Short Sell .003 0.95     
Distance (Miles) 7.01e-06 0.40     
Disclosure .01 0.22 .01 0.24 .01 0.25 
Director Liability .00001 1.00 -.001 0.86 -.001 0.85 
Shareholder Suit -.03** 0.03 -.03** 0.04 -.02** 0.05 
Insider Ownership  -.0002 0.71 -.0003 0.64 -.0005 0.43 
Institutional Ownership 
 
.0002 0.85 -.0002 0.81 .0004 0.70 
Noise Trader Risk -3.24*** 0.01 -4.40*** 0.00   
Synchronicity (R2) .33*** 0.00   .39*** 0.00 
Proportion of Trading in U.S.  .39* 0.07 .48*** 0.01 .41** 0.03 
 -.45** 0.04 -.54*** 0.01 -.49** 0.01 
Market Liquidity (Ln(MCAP)) -.01 0.42 .01 0.60 -.002 0.89 
        
Constant .74*** 0.00 .75*** 0.00 .59*** 0.00 
        
Obs 142  142  142  
Adj. R2 0.27  0.22  0.24  
(*), (**) and (***) indicate the estimate is significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
iεσ
2R
ADRτ%
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For the volatility transfer from the ADRs to their underlying stocks (Table 1.7 Model 2 
and Model 3), the coefficient of disclosure is significantly positive whereas the coefficient of 
shareholder suit is significantly negative. These findings again provide mixed support to 
Hypothesis 2. The coefficient of institutional ownership is significantly negative, which does not 
support Hypothesis 3. The coefficient of noise trader risk is significantly negative and the 
coefficient of synchronicity is significantly positive. These two results support Hypotheses 4 and 
5 respectively. The significantly negative coefficient of market liquidity is contrary to our 
hypothesis. However, the market liquidity here is measured by firm size; if larger firms tend to 
have the majority of informed traders domiciled in the home market, then the effect of ADR on 
home shares is likely small.   
With regard to the volatility transfer from the underlying stocks to the ADRs (Table 1.8 
Model 2 and Model 3), the coefficient of director liability is significantly negative while the 
other investor protection measures are not significant. These are contrary to Hypothesis 2. The 
coefficient of noise trader risk is significantly negative and the coefficient of synchronicity is 
significantly positive, which support both Hypotheses 4 and 5. The coefficient of market 
liquidity is significantly positive. This supports Hypothesis 6.    
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Table 1.7 Regression of Volatility Transfer Effect from ADRs to Underlying Stocks on 
Market Development, Investment Restrictions, Investor Protection, Ownership Structure, 
Noise Trader Risk, Synchronicity, Proportion of Trading in U.S. and Market Liquidity of 
the Issuing Firm’s Stocks 
 
1b  is obtained from the following MA(1)-GARCH(1,1)–M model:  
UDL
t,i
UDL
1t,i3
UDL
t,i2
ADR
t,i10
UDL
t,i hRR ε+εβ+β+β+β= − ,  ( )UDLt,i1tUDLt,i h,0N~| −Ωε , 
( ) ( ) UDL1t32UDL1t,i22ADRt,i10UDLt,i hbb)bbexp(h −− +ε+ε+=  
   Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 
Volatility Transfer ADR  
to Underlying Stock 
Volatility Transfer ADR  
to Underlying Stock 
Volatility Transfer ADR  
to Underlying Stock
Dependent Variable 1b   1b   1b  
 Coef.  P>|t| Coef.  P>|t| Coef.  P>|t| 
Independent Variables       
       
Market Development (Ln(PCGNI)) -50422 0.19 7295 0.82 11819 0.71 
Short Sell 215231*** 0.01     
Distance (Miles) 8 0.54     
Disclosure 6329 0.60 19328* 0.09 19714* 0.09 
Director Liability 2398 0.83 -172 0.99 -2006 0.86 
Shareholder Suit -40642** 0.06 -41911** 0.03 -41806** 0.03 
Insider Ownership  373 0.70 87 0.93 -323 0.74 
Institutional Ownership 
 
-3870*** 0.01 -4810*** 0.00 -4372*** 0.01 
Noise Trader Risk -4886893*** 0.01 
-
5278981*** 0.00   
Synchronicity (R2) 270877* 0.08   313489** 0.04 
Proportion of Trading in U.S.  -374172 0.27 65266 0.83 24462 0.94 
 511377 0.14 88497 0.77 105081 0.74 
Market Liquidity (Ln(MCAP)) -55740*** 0.00 -42143*** 0.01 -43438*** 0.01 
        
Constant 1033789*** 0.01 535828 0.12 313214 0.35 
        
Obs 133  133  133  
Adj. R2 0.16  0.12  0.08  
(*), (**) and (***) indicate the estimate is significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
iεσ
2R
ADRτ%
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Table 1.8 Regression of Volatility Transfer Effect from Underlying Stocks to ADRs on 
Market Development, Investment Restrictions, Investor Protection, Ownership Structure, 
Noise Trader Risk, Synchronicity, Proportion of Trading in U.S. and Market Liquidity of 
the Issuing Firm’s Stocks 
 
1a  is obtained from the following MA(1)-GARCH(1,1)–M model:  
ADR
t,i
ADR
1t,i3
ADR
t,i2
UDL
t,i10
ADR
t,i hRR ε+εα+α+α+α= − ,  ( )ADRt,i1tADRt,i h,0N~| −Ωε , 
( ) ( ) ADR1t32ADR1t,i22UDLt,i10ADRt,i haa)aaexp(h −− +ε+ε+=  
   Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 
Volatility Transfer 
from  Underlying 
Stock to ADR
Volatility Transfer 
from  Underlying 
Stock to ADR
Volatility Transfer 
from  Underlying 
Stock to ADR
Dependent Variable 1a   1a   1a  
 Coef.  P>|t| Coef.  P>|t| Coef.  P>|t| 
Independent Variables            
            
Market Development (Ln(PCGNI)) 16 0.71 25 0.45 25 0.44 
Short Sell 20 0.85     
Distance (Miles) .01 0.74     
Disclosure 9 0.52 9 0.52 9 0.49 
Director Liability -23* 0.08 -24* 0.07 -26* 0.06 
Shareholder Suit 2 0.93 4 0.85 9 0.70 
Insider Ownership  .24 0.82 .30 0.78 -.12 0.91 
Institutional Ownership 
 
1 0.55 .50 0.78 1.73 0.32 
Noise Trader Risk -4920** 0.03 -6282*** 0.00   
Synchronicity (R2) 390** 0.05   514*** 0.01 
Proportion of Trading in U.S.  -314 0.46 -203 0.57 -309 0.38 
 191 0.66 74 0.84 161 0.66 
Market Liquidity (Ln(MCAP)) 53** 0.02 69*** 0.00 65*** 0.00 
        
Constant -243 0.61 -290 0.44 -572* 0.10 
        
Obs 127  127  127  
Adj. R2 0.32  0.31  0.30  
(*), (**) and (***) indicate the estimate is significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
iεσ
2R
ADRτ%
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Given that some of the above findings are mixed and that some previous studies 
document that ADR returns are affected by the U.S. equity market, home equity market and 
home currency returns (Jiang (1998), Choi and Kim (2000), Patro (2000), Kim, Szakmary and 
Mathur (2002), Kutan and Zhou (2006)), a further analysis is performed.  This added analysis of 
the return and volatility transfers controls in both the conditional return and conditional variance 
of the GARCH model for the aforementioned market returns as in the following.  
 
ADR
t,i
ADR
1t,i6
ADR
t,i5t,FX4t,H3t,US2
UDL
t,i10
ADR
t,i hRRRRR ε+εα+α+α+α+α+α+α= − ,   
  ( )ADRt,i1tADRt,i h,0N~| −Ωε , 
( ) ( ) ADR1t62ADR1t,i5t,FX4t,H3t,US22UDLt,i10ADRt,i haa)RaRaRaaaexp(h −− +ε++++ε+=  
-----------------------(5) 
 
UDL
t,i
UDL
1t,i6
UDL
t,i5t,FX4t,H3t,US2
ADR
t,i10
UDL
t,i hRRRRR ε+εβ+β+β+β+β+β+β= − ,  
( )UDLt,i1tUDLt,i h,0N~| −Ωε , 
( ) ( ) UDL1t62UDL1t,i5t,FX4t,H3t,US22ADRt,i10UDLt,i hbb)RbRbRbbbexp(h −− +ε++++ε+=  
-----------------------(6) 
where t,USR , t,HR  and t,FXR  are the daily returns of U.S. equity market, home equity market and 
home currency respectively from day t-1 to day t.  
In short, the estimation here extends the baseline model by including the impacts of the 
three related markets: U.S. equity market, home equity market, and home currency returns on the 
return and volatility transfers.   
This model’s regression results of the return transfer effects are shown in Table 1.9. The 
coefficient of market development is significantly positive in the bi-directional return transfer 
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between the ADRs and their underlying stocks. This finding gives some very strong support to 
Hypothesis 1.  For the country investor protection variables, only the coefficient of disclosure is 
significantly positive in the return transfer from the ADRs to their underlying stocks. On the 
other hand, the coefficient of shareholder suit remains significant in the return transfers in both 
directions, and it is not in the expected direction. It is possible that there are substantial 
measurement problems regarding the effectiveness of shareholder suits. Alternatively, this 
variable is correlated with disclosure and director liability, suggesting that its sign might not be 
entirely reliable. The coefficients of insider ownership and institutional ownership are no longer 
significant in the return transfer in either direction. Therefore, taken together, variables related to 
corporate governance are partially consistent with corporate governance being important though 
less than robust. One possible explanation for this is that the effects of corporate governance tend 
to be long term. Return and volatility transfers, on the other hand, are relatively short-term events. 
If so, it is not too surprising that the relations between transfer and corporate governance are not 
strong. Turning to the more market-based variables, the results are largely the same as those 
using the baseline model. Specifically, noise trader risk is only significantly negative in the 
return transfer from the underlying stocks to the ADRs, the coefficient of synchronicity remains 
significantly positive in the return transfer from the underlying stocks to the ADRs but turns to 
significantly negative from ADRs to their underlying stocks. The coefficients of the proportion 
of trading in U.S.  is significantly positive in the return transfer from ADRs to their underlying 
stocks.  
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Table 1.9 Regression of Return Transfer Effect between ADRs and Underlying Stocks on Market Development, Investment 
Restrictions, Investor Protection, Ownership Structure, Noise Trader Risk, Synchronicity, Proportion of Trading in U.S. and 
Market Liquidity of the Issuing Firm’s Stocks after Controlling for U.S. Equity Market Return, Home Equity Market Return 
and Home Currency Return 
1α , 1a , 1β , 1b   are obtained from the following MA(1)-GARCH(1,1)–M models:  
ADR
t,i
ADR
1t,i6
ADR
t,i5t,FX4t,H3t,US2
UDL
t,i10
ADR
t,i hRRRRR ε+εα+α+α+α+α+α+α= − ,  ( )ADRt,i1tADRt,i h,0N~| −Ωε ,  ( ) ( ) ADR1t62ADR1t,i5t,FX4t,H3t,US22UDLt,i10ADRt,i haa)RaRaRaaaexp(h −− +ε++++ε+=  
  
UDL
t,i
UDL
1t,i6
UDL
t,i5t,FX4t,H3t,US2
ADR
t,i10
UDL
t,i hRRRRR ε+εβ+β+β+β+β+β+β= − , ( )UDLt,i1tUDLt,i h,0N~| −Ωε , ( ) ( ) UDL1t62UDL1t,i5t,FX4t,H3t,US22ADRt,i10UDLt,i hbb)RbRbRbbbexp(h −− +ε++++ε+=  
 From ADR to Underlying Stock From Underlying Stock to ADR 
 Return Transfer  Return Transfer Return Transfer Return Transfer 
Dependent Variable 1β   1β   1α   1α  
Independent Variables                
Market Development (Ln(PCGNI)) .05*** 0.00 .06*** 0.00 .05*** 0.01 .05*** 0.01 
Short Sell         
Distance (Miles)         
Disclosure .02*** 0.01 .02*** 0.01 .005 0.55 .01 0.52 
Director Liability .01 0.23 .01 0.29 .001 0.86 .001 0.85 
Shareholder Suit -.05*** 0.00 -.05*** 0.00 -.03** 0.02 -.03** 0.03 
Insider Ownership  -.0002 0.67 -.0003 0.53 -.0004 0.49 -.001 0.35 
Institutional Ownership 
 
.001 0.14 .001 0.15 -.001 0.48 -.0002 0.80 
Noise Trader Risk -.61 0.55   -3.97*** 0.00   
Synchronicity (R2)   -.29*** 0.00   .39*** 0.00 
Proportion of Trading in U.S.  .61*** 0.00 .64*** 0.00 .34* 0.10 .28 0.17 
 -.65*** 0.00 -.68*** 0.00 -.41* 0.06 -.36* 0.09 
Market Liquidity (Ln(MCAP)) .02** 0.04 .04*** 0.00 .01 0.61 -.003 0.76 
Constant .28 0.14 .11 0.52 .51** 0.03 .388* 0.06 
Obs 144  144  144  144  
Adj. R2 0.27  0.34  0.25  0.28  
(*), (**) and (***) indicate the estimate is significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
iεσ
2R
ADRτ%
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Table 1.10 presents the results of the volatility transfer between the ADRs and their 
underlying stocks after controlling for the market returns. The coefficient of market development 
is significantly positive in the volatility transfer from the ADRs to their underlying stocks. The 
coefficient of disclosure is significantly positive in the volatility transfer from the underlying 
stocks to the ADRs. The coefficient of the shareholder suit is significantly negative from the 
ADRs to their underlying stocks. The coefficient of institutional ownership is significantly 
negative from the ADRs to their underlying stocks. The coefficient of the noise trader risk is 
significantly negative from the direction of ADRs to underlying stocks. The coefficient of 
synchronicity is significantly positive between them. The coefficient of market liquidity is 
significantly negative in the volatility transfer from the ADRs to their underlying stocks. In sum, 
these conclusions remain largely the same, with or without controlling for market returns.
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Table 1.10 Regression of Volatility Transfer Effect between ADRs and Underlying Stocks on Market Development, Investment 
Restrictions, Investor Protection, Ownership Structure, Noise Trader Risk, Synchronicity, Proportion of Trading in U.S. and 
Market Liquidity of the Issuing Firm’s Stocks after Controlling for U.S. Equity Market Return, Home Equity Market Return 
and Home Currency Return  
1α , 1a , 1β , 1b   are obtained from the following MA(1)-GARCH(1,1)–M models:  
ADR
t,i
ADR
1t,i6
ADR
t,i5t,FX4t,H3t,US2
UDL
t,i10
ADR
t,i hRRRRR ε+εα+α+α+α+α+α+α= − ,  ( )ADRt,i1tADRt,i h,0N~| −Ωε , ( ) ( ) ADR1t62ADR1t,i5t,FX4t,H3t,US22UDLt,i10ADRt,i haa)RaRaRaaaexp(h −− +ε++++ε+=  
UDL
t,i
UDL
1t,i6
UDL
t,i5t,FX4t,H3t,US2
ADR
t,i10
UDL
t,i hRRRRR ε+εβ+β+β+β+β+β+β= − , ( )UDLt,i1tUDLt,i h,0N~| −Ωε , ( ) ( ) UDL1t62UDL1t,i5t,FX4t,H3t,US22ADRt,i10UDLt,i hbb)RbRbRbbbexp(h −− +ε++++ε+=  
 From ADR to Underlying Stock From Underlying Stock to ADR 
 Volatility Transfer  Volatility Transfer Volatility Transfer Volatility Transfer 
Dependent Variable 1b   2b   1a   1a  
Independent Variables                
Market Development (Ln(PCGNI)) 1141* 0.06 1243** 0.04 -940 0.43 -1395 0.23 
Short Sell         
Distance (Miles)         
Disclosure 415 0.13 422 0.13 1240*** 0.01 1245*** 0.01 
Director Liability 211 0.41 162 0.53 17 0.97 127 0.79 
Shareholder Suit -1066** 0.02 -979** 0.03 -66 0.94 -22 0.98 
Insider Ownership  -15 0.43 -23 0.25 -22 0.57 -15 0.69 
Institutional Ownership 
 
-66** 0.05 -53* 0.10 57 0.36 48 0.42 
Noise Trader Risk -134318*** 0.00   38357 0.61   
Synchronicity (R2)   10976*** 0.00   14812** 0.02 
Proportion of Trading in U.S.  1205 0.85 -603 0.92 -11871 0.34 -12394 0.31 
 2784 0.66 4105 0.52 9495 0.46   10849 0.39 
Market Liquidity (Ln(MCAP)) -1022*** 0.00 -1174*** 0.00 285 0.68 -6689 0.35 
Constant 3506 0.60 -2472 0.70 -2400 0.86 5867 0.63 
Obs 128  128  119  119  
Adj. R2 0.12  0.11  0.02  0.07  
(*), (**) and (***) indicate the estimate is significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
iεσ
2R
ADRτ%
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1.8  Conclusions 
This paper examines return and volatility transfers between ADRs and their underlying 
stocks using 145 ADR-underlying stock pairs issued by firms in 25 countries trading during the 
period from January 2003 through December 2007. Our investigation differs from previous 
studies in that we cover substantially more countries and that we attempt to explain the variations 
of the extents of transfer effects across stocks and countries. Various hypotheses are developed, 
based on the premise that barriers associated with trading, investments, and corporate 
governance would lower the extent of transfers.  
Our primary results are described as follows. After controlling for U.S. equity market, 
home equity market and home currency returns, the extent of market developments increases the 
bi-directional return transfers and the unidirectional volatility transfers from the ADRs to their 
underlying stocks. Disclosure requirement increases the return transfer from the ADRs to their 
underlying stocks and the volatility transfer in the opposite direction. Shareholders’ ability to sue 
officers and directors for misconduct lowers the return transfer in both directions and the 
volatility transfer from the ADRs to their underlying stocks. These results are contrary to our 
Hypothesis 2. One possible reason for this may be measurement problems. For example, Morck, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1988) find that the relation between managerial ownership and firm value is 
non-linear. Further, insider ownership might vary considerably across countries. Institutional 
ownership lowers the volatility transfer from the ADRs to their underlying stocks. Noise trader 
risk lowers the return transfer from the underlying stock to the ADRs and the volatility transfer 
from the ADRs to their underlying stocks. Synchronicity lowers the return transfer from the 
ADRs to their underlying stocks but increases it in the opposite direction. On the other hand, it 
increases the bi-directional volatility transfers. Proportion of trading in the U.S. increases the 
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return transfer from the ADRs to their underlying stocks. Market liquidity increases the return 
transfer but lowers the volatility transfer from the ADRs to their underlying stocks. In summary, 
most results are in agreement with our hypotheses, and the general findings indicate that these 
barriers have an effect on the magnitude of return and volatility transfer effects. Further 
theoretical development might help to explain some inconsistencies here, particularly on 
volatility transfer. Compared to return transfer, the transmission of volatility is more likely to be 
complicated with factors that we do not incorporate.      
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CHAPTER 2 
ADR MARKET TIMING: IN WHICH MARKET DO ISSUERS POSSESS BETTER 
MARKET-TIMING ABILITY AND WHAT IS THE ROLE OF REGULATIONS? 
 
 
2.1 Abstract 
An ADR issue’s proceeds might depend on the conditions of three markets: its home 
equity market, U.S. equity market, or currency market. From purely the standpoint of 
information accessibility, ADR issuers are likely to time their issues with respect to the 
conditions of home equity market and/or currency market. However, regulations and other 
market imperfections might make timing these two markets difficult. This essay empirically 
examines the relative market timing ability of ADR issuers in these three markets. Using a 
sample of 134 capital raising ADR issues from 16 countries during the period from January 1998 
through December 2006, we find that high beta SEO ADR issuers seem to time the U.S. equity 
market; the same is also true in tightly regulated countries. Although the evidence is not 
overwhelming, the findings suggest the existence of market-timing ability, and that regulations 
and market imperfections can affect timing ability.    
 
2.2 Introduction 
Previous research indicates that market timing appears to occur in security issuance. This 
is partially consistent with theories such as Myers and Majulf (1984) in which managers care 
about existing shareholders more than new investors. As a result they have incentives to sell 
equity at market upswings.   
This study attempts to extend timing studies in two ways. First, we examine whether 
timing ability exists in the issuance of American Depository Receipts (ADRs). While there is 
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abundance of literature on security offers, few examine whether timing effects are present in the 
ADR issuances. Investigating timing effects of ADRs has the potential to further explore the 
importance of information asymmetry in security issuance. If the world market is integrated in 
terms of information accessibility, then we would expect timing effects of ADRs to be similar to 
those of the U.S. If information is incomplete or costly, then timing ability would be weakened. 
Moreover, an ADR issuer should be concerned with three markets when choosing an appropriate 
issuance time, namely the home equity market, the U.S. equity market, and the currency market. 
Under information asymmetry and assuming that firms have more information about their home 
environment, they are more likely to have the ability to time home equity and/or currency 
markets, but not the U.S. market. That is, the results here should have implications for the role of 
information accessibility in selling stocks. The literature on the timing of ADRs is sparse; to our 
knowledge only Pasquariello, Yuan and Zhu (2006) directly look into this issue. However, their 
analysis utilizes only country-level data, specifically the number of ADR issues from a country. 
This number seems to be a crude measure of timing effects and it is plausible that this number 
can be influenced by factors other than information availability. These factors would include 
regulations, market liquidity, tax, and others. In contrast, this study utilizes firm-level data, thus 
allows a richer set of testing. Additionally, since their focus is on the currency market, they 
exclude countries that have relatively fixed currency value. One country excluded in their study 
is China, which has high representation in the ADR market in recent years. The analysis here 
includes these countries.  
A secondary purpose of this study is to examine the relevance of regulation in market 
timing. If regulatory restrictions do not allow firms to fully utilize their information, they are less 
likely to be able to time the market(s). To assess the role of regulations, we compare results 
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between tightly-regulated and loosely-regulated countries, and before and after the passage of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002. The SOX requires, among other things, that an independent 
board oversees auditors of public companies, and that CEOs and CFOs be personally responsible 
for the accuracy of their firm’s financial reports. We expect that the tighter the regulation(s) 
faced by the ADR issuers, the more difficulty they might have in their market timing activities. 
With this reasoning, weaker market timing activities by ADR issuers are expected in tightly-
regulated countries and also after the passage of SOX. 
Previous research indicates that the major reasons for ADR issuance include lower cost 
of capital, higher liquidity, obtaining medium of exchange in merger and acquisition transactions, 
and acquisition of needed foreign currency5. It should be pointed out that this study does not 
attempt to provide more insights on the motivations of ADR issuance; rather, we take as given 
that ADR issuance has some benefits. Our focus is that, given the benefits and the decisions of 
selling ADRs, do issuers demonstrate timing ability and, if so, in which market do they tend to 
process timing ability.6 
Because the focus here is on issue timing, the sample firms here include all ADRs that 
involve capital-raising, regardless of whether an issue has been previously sold in the U.S. 
However, there are a non-trivial number of firms, particularly from China, that sell ADRs 
without any prior trading history, not even in their home countries; that is, these firms are truly 
conducting “initial” public offers. Because these companies are selling stocks to the public for 
the first time, pricing uncertainty is likely high and a large part of this uncertainty is likely 
                                                 
5 Comprehensive surveys of why firms list their stocks abroad can be found in Karolyi (1998), Pagano, Roell and 
Zechner (2002),  Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2004), Doige, Karolyi, Lins, Miller and Stulz (2005) and Karolyi 
(2006).   
6 Other studies relate these ADR performances to the market segmentation hypothesis. They include Kadlec and 
Mcconnell (1994), Sundaram and Logue (1996), Miller (1999), Levine and Schmukler (2006), Forester and Karolyi 
(1993,1998, 1999, 2000). Theoretical models on how firms in segmented markets can lower their costs of capital 
and thus increase their market values can be found in Stapleton and Subrahmanyam (1977), Errunza and Losq 
(1985), and Alexander, Eun and Janakiramanan (1988).  
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idiosyncratic in nature. One would suspect that market timing ability of these set of firms would 
be limited, and therefore the analysis of these firms is performed separately. For convenience, we 
refer the sample firms without listing history in their home countries as initial public offerings 
(IPO) sample while all others as seasoned equity offers (SEO) sample. Because the SEO sample 
is larger and timing effect is more likely to be present, our focus will be on the SEO sample.  
Our primary findings are that, for the SEO sample, there is some evidence supporting 
timing ability of these firms, particularly in the U.S. equity market and some in the currency 
market. However, the evidence of timing effects is far from overwhelming.  Regarding the role 
of regulations, the results are somewhat consistent with SOX having an effect on market timing 
ability; however, the evidence here is also weak. As for the IPO sample, the results are generally 
inconclusive. Taken together, the overall results suggest that the timing ability of foreign firms 
selling ADRs is very limited. Assuming that a strong timing effect is present in the U.S. market, 
as some studies show, our results here indirectly suggest that foreign firms as a whole are not 
well-informed about market conditions.  
The rest of this essay is organized as follows: Section 2.3 gives a review of the related 
studies. Section 2.4 presents the hypotheses and the methodology. Section 2.5 specifies the data 
sources and sample construction. Section 2.6 provides the empirical results and discussions. 
Section 2.7 concludes the findings of this paper. 
 
2.3 Literature Review 
The literature review is arranged in the following order: first theories and empirical 
studies related to security issuance timing, and then the relatively few empirical studies on ADR 
issuances.  
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Several empirical studies document evidence that managers time the market when they 
issue equity. Myers and Majluf (1984) put forth a theory that under information asymmetry, 
managers possessing superior information about the future prospects of their firms have 
incentive to issue overvalued equity. Thus, in equilibrium, we tend to see poor quality firms issue 
equity. As a result, stock price of issuing firms falls upon the announcement of new equity 
issues.  
Ritter (1991, 2003) examines the ability of managers to create value for existing 
shareholders by timing IPOs. He finds, on average, IPOs underperform in the long term, 
suggesting that IPO issuers have timing ability.  He argues that, in so doing, the managers take 
advantage of the time-varying relative costs between debt and equity arisen from market 
inefficiencies. These managers issue equity when their stock prices are high. They will turn to 
internal funds or debt issues when they find that their stock prices are low. On the other hand, 
investors do not seem to realize the pricing implications of this timing behavior. Also, Graham 
and Harvey (2001) survey reveals that most of the CFOs responding to the survey take into 
consideration the amount by which their stocks are undervalued or overvalued in issuing equity. 
These corporate executives consider perceived mis-valuations of their firms and stock price run-
ups as two major determinants of their equity issue decisions. These findings are consistent with 
the earlier documentation of Lucas and McDonald (1990) that firms in general issue seasoned 
equity after a run-up in their stock prices.  
Some studies attribute the poor post-issue performance of equity issuing firms to the 
market timing activities of the firms’ managers. Loughran and Ritter (1995) show that these 
firms (either IPO or SEO) significantly underperform the non-issuing firms for five years after 
the offering date. The average annual return is merely 5 percent for IPO firms and 7 percent for 
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SEO firms. This underperformance is economically significant since it would require investors to 
invest 44 percent more money in the issuing firms so as to achieve the same result as investing in 
the comparable non-issuing firms matched by market capitalization. Consistent with some 
previous findings7, Loughran and Ritter (1995) demonstrate that issuing firms take advantage of 
investors' mis-valuations of both IPOs and SEOs in issuing equity.  Lee (1997) studies whether 
managers knowingly sell overvalued equity by examining the relation between top executives' 
trading and the long-run stock returns of firms that had made seasoned equity offering(s). He 
finds that top executives often sell their shares before the offerings, suggesting that they perceive 
that the equity is overvalued by the market8. Taking a different track in analyzing the market 
timing of equity offering by corporate managers, Burch, Christie and Nanda (2004) compare the 
one-year post-issue performance of firms making rights offers to those making firm commitment 
SEOs. They argue that if managers want to take advantage of their private information and the 
overvalued stock, they will be more likely to go for firm commitment offering than a rights 
offering. Based on the theory of Myers and Mujluf (1984), the use of firm commitment offerings 
suggests that managers are more concerned with the welfare of the existing shareholders and 
have greater incentive to time the market. Burch, Christie and Nanda (2004) find significantly 
negative abnormal returns for firms using firm commitment offerings but not for those relying on 
rights issues. Their result implies that firm commitment offerings were timed but rights offerings 
were not.     
                                                 
7Literature on mis-valuation of IPOs include Jain and Kini (1994) : the median operating cash flow-to-assets ratio of 
IPO firms fell tremendously over the year before going public to the three years after that; Mikkelson and Shah 
(1994) : while the sales of IPO firms grew, total cash flows stayed about the same as at the offering time; Lerner 
(1994): IPO activity  is highly associated with the price at which the public investors are willing to pay. As for mis-
valuation of SEOs, there are earlier Stigler (1964) and Friend and Longstreet (1967) and more recently Lucas and 
McDonald (1990).  Stigler (1964) and Friend and Longstreet (1967) both find that issuing firms do poorly over the 
long run. Lucas and McDonald (1990) shows undervalued firms delay their equity offering.  
8Other studies that had reported significant increase in insider trading around SEOs and are consistent with the 
notion of insiders intentionally sell overvalued equity include Karpoff and Lee (1991) and Kahle (1995).  
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It is not uncommon to find new equity issues clustering at certain times. Loughran, Ritter 
and Rydqvist (1994), Eckbo and Masulis (1995), Loughran and Ritter (1995), Baker and Wurgler 
(2000) and   Burch, Christie and Nanda (2004) look at the market timing activities of equity 
issues clustering in hot issue markets with strong stock market performance and business 
expansion. They find that firms issue relatively more equity right after a year of their own high 
equity returns and just before years of low market returns. Baker and Wurgler (2000)'s 
explanation for this phenomenon is that when a firms' equity is overvalued due to a change in 
investor sentiment, managers would issue equity to take advantage of these mis-valuations. 
These “hot issue market” studies also suggest that equity issuers do not only time their 
idiosyncratic returns but also the market returns.     
As financial markets become more and more integrated globally, potential market timing 
in international security issuance decisions is gaining attention. Loughran, Ritter and Rydqvist 
(1994) analyze the relation between market timing and the long-run performance of IPOs from 
an international perspective. They demonstrate evidence that IPO volume is positively correlated 
with the inflation-adjusted level of stock market. This finding suggests that firms time their IPOs 
to take advantage of investors' mis-valuations of their stocks. This results in low returns over the 
long run. In addition, private firms have market timing ability especially when the market 
multiples are high.     
The literature on ADRs market timing effects is sparse. In a study not restricted to ADRs, 
Henderson, Jegadeesh and Weisback (2003) find that world equity issue may predict future 
market returns (both within individual countries and world market) because firms tend to 
increase collectively their equity issues when the market is overvalued.  Also, they show that 
most cross-border equities are issued in U.S. and U.K. when these markets are at or near their 
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peaks.  In a series of papers, Schaub (2002, 2003, and 2004) investigates the short-term and long-
term performances of ADR issuances, but do not specifically look at the timing issue. Schaub 
(2002) finds that Mexican ADRs perform well in the short term, but poorly in the long term. 
Schaub (2003) compare the performance among ADRs from Latin American, Asia-Pacific, and 
Europe. He demonstrates that, for ADRs, IPOs outperform SEOs and developed market issues 
outperform those from emerging markets. Additionally, SEOs underperform IPOs in the first 
year but then outperform the IPO in the second and third year of trading. Both IPOs and SEOs 
underperform the S&P500 in the short run and long run. He concludes that these results imply 
that U.S. market overprices ADRs in the short and long term.  Schaub (2004) obtains similar 
results. In addition, he finds some long term wealth effects for Asia-Pacific ADRs when the 
S&P500 is undergoing major correction. As for the European sample of ADRs, price run-ups 
seem to occur primarily in the short term (say, day one returns) but not in the long-term.   
The paper that is most related to the current study is Pasquariello, Yuan and Zhu (2006). 
They test whether foreign firms consider currency market conditions in their ADR issuance 
decisions. They find that foreign firms tend to issue ADRs after their local currency turns 
abnormally strong or before it becomes abnormally weak against the U.S. dollars. These findings 
are consistent with the market timing literature on equity markets.  In addition, they find that the 
likelihood of ADR issuances is associated with the prior abnormal returns of a firm’s home 
equity market. On the other hand, the number of ADR issuance is less sensitive to changes in 
U.S. equity market returns.    
In sum, there is some evidence that managers have some market timing ability, but most 
extant studies look at the U.S. market. Similar findings are obtained from the few studies that 
examine cross-border equity issuance. However, there is no study that specifically looks at 
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whether the existence of multiple markets and country regulations might affect this market 
timing ability. This study is trying to fill this gap of the literature.  
 
2.4 Hypotheses and Methodologies 
When firms issue equity just domestically, it makes sense for them to time the local 
equity market as this is the only market involved. When it comes to issuing equity overseas, say 
via the ADR programs in the U.S., the conditions of three different markets --the home equity 
market, the U.S. equity market and the currency market--should have an impact on the particular 
issue. To see this, in the absence of arbitrage opportunities and ignoring transaction costs, the 
market price of an ADR should be 
 
RateExchangeRatioADRicePrStockUnderlyings'ADRicePrADR ××=  
 
With this simple pricing mechanism, both underlying home market price and exchange 
rate should affect ADR pricing. The market conditions of the U.S. are likely to affect ADR 
pricing too. However, assuming that firms have more information about their home environment, 
they are more likely to have the ability to time home equity market and/or currency market, but 
not the U.S. equity market. 
 Both home equity market regulations and U.S. equity market regulations may affect the 
timing ability of the ADR issuers. There is an increasingly large body of literature on the relation 
between law and finance. For example, LaPorta et al (1998) find a relation between regulation 
and ownership while others find a relation between law and financing. Generally, firms in 
countries with restrictive regulations tend to have less access to financing (See Goshen and 
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Parchomovsky (2004) and Healy and Palepu (2001) for discussions on regulations). The more 
regulation on investment/capital raising a country has, the more difficulties those firms may 
encounter in raising capital. This likely limits the choice of when a firm could raise capital. Thus, 
regulation will be expected to reduce the market timing ability of the ADR issuers.  
Based on the above analysis, two hypotheses are to be tested in this study. They are 
formulated as below.  
Hypothesis 1. ADR issuers are more likely to time their home equity and/or currency 
market, based on information accessibility.  
Hypothesis 2. The stricter the regulation, the less the market timing ability of ADR 
issuers.  
To test these two hypotheses, an approach similar to that of Pasquariello, Yuan and Zhu 
(2006) is adopted here. In their analysis, the number of ADR issues from a country is the 
dependent variable, while market returns serve as the explanatory variables. Also, they assume 
that the number of ADR issues follows a Poisson distribution. In this paper, we examine the 
dollar amount or proceeds of ADR issuance, rather than the number of ADR issues. The use of 
amount is arguably more relevant to firms than the number of issues.  Moreover, the number of 
issues is probably too crude a metric to assess the importance of timing ability and is potentially 
influenced by factors such as regulations. The main difference, however, is that this research 
utilizes firm-level data, rather than country-level data.  
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The regression model is shown as below. 
 
( ) ( )
)h()h(cumexrret)h(
)h(cumusreth)h(cummktret)h(hproceeds
ntnt3
nt2nt1int
ν+β
+β+β+α=
----------------(1) 
where  intproceeds is the proceeds of the issue amount, adjusted for firm size, of the ADR issued 
by firm i of country n in month t, )h(cummktretnt , )h(cumusretnt  and  )h(cumexrretnt are the 
cumulative returns9 for the home equity market, U.S. equity market and currency market 
respectively from h months to one month before the event month or one month to h months after 
the event month. The local currency exchange rate is defined as the U.S. dollar per unit of local 
currency. 
In this model, β1, β2 and β3 measure the impacts on proceeds of the cumulative returns of 
the home equity market, U.S. equity market, and currency market respectively. Their signs are 
our primary focus. A significantly positive estimate of iβ  implies that ADR issue proceeds in 
month t increase with individual realized cumulative returns over h month where h < 0 (h > 0) is 
h month before (after) the issue month. More specifically, for βi, timing effects are suggested if 
it is significantly positive before and/or significantly negative after the issuance10.  
Market timing is more critical for a volatile stock. Therefore, we expect that volatile 
firms to have more incentive for timing. To test this and as a robustness check, we use beta as a 
                                                 
9 Pasquariello, Yuan and Zhu (2006) use the abnormal returns after de-trending the return series using an AR(2) 
formula in the form of   
retnt = Φ0n +  Φ1n retnt-1+  Φ2nretnt-2 + Φ3nt + εnt  . As will be seen later, only a few of the return series in this study 
have significant trends, therefore, the return series are not de-trended.  
10 If the issue proceeds increase with the pre-issue positive market returns (due to market upswings) and/or with the 
post-issue negative market returns (as a result of market downturns), this implies that the issuers have some market 
timing abilities. Similarly, if the issue proceeds decrease with the pre-issue negative market returns and/or with the 
post-issue positive market returns, again this indicates that the issuers seem to have some market timing abilities. 
Therefore, we should expect to see a positive beta for the pre-issue periods and a negative beta for the post-issue 
periods when regressing the issue proceeds adjusting for firm size on the market returns.   
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measure of volatility. Specifically, we divide the available SEO sample into high beta (beta > 1) 
and low beta (beta < 1) stocks. The betas are estimated by regressing the one year pre-issue daily 
returns of the home shares on the home market returns. Because IPOs have no prior trading 
history, such a test is not possible for the IPO sample here.    
The timing ability can be affected by country regulations, either regulation(s) on home 
equity market or those on U.S. equity market. Lacking a precise measure of regulatory 
constraints, we divide the countries into tightly and loosely regulated countries based on the 
financial freedom index11 and compare the market timing ability between the two sub-samples. 
The sample of tightly regulated countries consists of China, France, Germany, Greece, India,  
Japan, Korea and Taiwan, whereas the sample of loosely regulated countries include Hong Kong, 
Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Singapore, Spain, Switzerland and U.K.   
Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2006) find evidence that the U.S. market remains competitive 
after the enactment of SOX. Litvak (2006) finds that ADRs (Level II or III) that are subject to 
SOX experience stock price declines, while those not subject to the act do not. His findings 
suggest that SOX has an impact on ADR pricing. We expect that it will have an impact on ADR 
issuance as well, specifically less timing effect post SOX. The SOX was enacted in 2002, 
accordingly the sample is divided into two periods -- before 2002 and after 2002.  
 
                                                 
11 The financial freedom index is an index, which measures the degree of a country’s financial system subject to 
government regulations, tracked jointly by the Wall Street Journal and the Heritage Foundation. It is a component 
index of the broader economic freedom index. Both indexes rank the countries using a scale from 1 to 100 where 
lower score indicates heavy regulations and higher score implies free.  
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2.5 Data and Sample Description 
The capital raising ADR sample is formed by merging the ADS issues recorded in the 
database of Security Data Company (SDC), the DR capital raising database of Citibank 
(http://wwss.citissb.com/adr/www/brokers/index.htm), the DR directory of Bank of New York 
(http://www.adrbny.com/capraising_directory.jsp) and the DR universe of ADR.com 
(http://p2.adr.com/ADRII/DRUniverse.aspx?quicksearch=N). The local equity market and U.S. 
equity market returns are calculated from their monthly index levels downloaded from the 
Reuters Data Link. The exchange rates are downloaded from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. 
Louis (http://research.stlouisfed.org) website and Reuters Data Link. Betas of ADR issuers, if 
applicable, are calculated from the daily prices of home shares and daily close level of 
corresponding market indexes obtained from Reuters Data Link. Market values of the ADR 
issuing firms are obtained from Compustat. Information on financial freedom index is 
downloaded from The Wall Street Journal and The Heritage Foundation website 
(http://www.heritage.org/research/features/index/index.cfm). 
The sample period of this study spans from January 1998 to December 2006. The reason 
for examining this particular time period is to have an equal length before and after the passage 
of Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002. The pre-SOX subsample runs from 1998 to 2001 whereas the 
post-SOX subsample from 2003 through 2006. The entire sample includes Level III (U.S. listing 
& public offering) ADRs only. Level I (unlisted) ADRs, Level II (U.S. listing without public 
offering) ADRs, Rule 144A (U.S. private placement) ADRs and GDRs (listed and/or raise 
capital outside U.S.) are excluded; the major reason for their exclusion is that they are  not 
subject to the same registration and reporting requirements as those of Level III. The Global 
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Depositary Receipt Reference Guide 2008 by JPMorgan ADR Group has a comprehensive 
description on the difference in the characteristics of all the ADR types.     
As can be seen in Table 2.1, China (26) has the most IPO issues during the sample period 
and Taiwan (17) has the most SEO issues. The mean issue price ranges from $9.24 (Netherlands) 
to $59.61 (Japan). Switzerland ($1,082.36 mil) has relatively the largest mean ADR issue size 
whereas Spain ($26.74 mil) the smallest. Japan ($74,488.66 mil) has on average the largest ADR 
issuing firms while Ireland ($662.56 mil) has the smallest.   
Table 2.2 shows the number of available monthly observations, mean, standard deviation, 
R2, first order autocorrelation, second order autocorrelation as well as the Box-Ljung statistics 
for the time series of the currency market returns, home equity market returns and U.S. equity 
market returns. The Box-Ljung statistics computed up to 6 lags (LB(6)) indicates that the 
monthly exchange rate return series for all countries in the sample are white noise except Japan, 
China, India, South Korea and Ireland. LB(6) for the home equity market returns demonstrate 
that only the South Korea equity market return series is not white noise. As a result, unlike 
Pasquariello, Yuan and Zhu (2006), the return series in this study are not de-trended.  
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Table 2.1 Summary Statistics on ADR Issues 
 
This table reports the descriptive statistics of the ADR issues studied in this essay. It shows the 
number of ADRs of each country, which in turn, is grouped under 3 regions. Number of IPO 
issues, SEO issues, mean issue prices and mean amount of capital raised are extracted from 
various sources including SDC, ADR.com, Bank of New York and Citibank. Market Values of 
the ADR issuers are obtained from Compustat. 
   
Country 
 
Number 
of IPO 
Issues 
Number 
of SEO 
Issues 
Mean Issue 
Price (U.S.$) 
Mean 
Amount of 
Capital 
Raised  
(U.S.$, mil) 
Mean Market 
Value of ADR 
issuers as in 
the Issue 
Month 
(U.S.$, mil) 
      
Asia Developed      
      
Hong Kong 8 5 20.95 401.46 7,843.31 
Japan 0 3 59.61 88.78 74,488.66 
Singapore 1 1 43.00 401.72 7,450.65 
      
Asia Developing      
      
China 26 5 19.88 271.83 12,154.50 
India 3 14 32.26 307.83 6,689.44 
South Korea 5 13 21.03 530.79 9,084.03 
Taiwan 0 17 12.55 708.52 23,783.02 
      
Western 
European      
      
France 3 5 35.45 101.53 2,475.05 
Germany 2 2 32.97 507.16 48,825.87 
Greece 0 1 10.19 250.00 10,522.23 
Ireland 1 3 23.20 234.53 662.56 
Italy 2 0 27.11 566.20 26,672.53 
Netherlands 0 2 9.24 136.14 7,569.67 
Spain 0 2 11.61 26.74 34,007.98 
Switzerland 2 0 24.04 1,082.36 6,801.02 
United Kingdom 2 6 37.19 182.82 8,736.31 
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Table 2.2  Summary Statistics of Equity and Currency Market Returns 
 
This table shows the number of available monthly returns, mean, standard deviation, R2, first order autocorrelation (ρ(1)), 
second order autocorrelation (ρ(2)) and the Box-Ljung statistics (computed up to lag 6) for the exchange rate return series in 
Panel A and local equity market return and U.S. equity market return series in Panel B for the period from July  1997 through 
June 2007. p-values are reported in brackets.  (*), (**) and (***) indicate the estimate is significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
level respectively.  
              
  Panel A : Exchange Rate Returns Panel B : Equity Market Returns
Country 
Number of  
Monthly  
Returns Mean Std Dev R2 ρ(1) ρ(2) LB(6) Mean Std Dev R2 ρ(1) ρ(2) LB(6) 
Asia Developed              
Hong Kong 120 -.007% .11% 0.02 -.16* -.001 4.22 .32% 7.79% 0.001 -.01 .03 5.31 
  (0.47)   (0.09) (0.99) (0.64) (0.65)   (0.94) (0.73) (0.50) 
Japan 120 -.05% 3.36% 0.06 -.14 .17* 17.86*** -.09% 5.84% 0.01 -.01 .079 3.27 
  (0.86)   (0.14) (0.06) (0.01) (0.87)   (0.93) (0.39) (0.77) 
Singapore 120 -.05% .76% 0.003 -.05 .03 8.31 .49% 7.60% 0.01 .10 .034 4.41 
   (0.74)   (0.62) (0.73) (0.22) (0.49)   (0.30) (0.72) (0.62) 
Asia Emerging              
China 120 .07%*** .23% 0.11 .21** .24*** 31.87*** .96% 7.10% 0.03 .16* .03 7.04 
  (0.001)   (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.14)   (0.09) (0.72) (0.32) 
India 120 -.10% 1.41% 0.04 .20** -.02 16.75*** 1.02% 7.61% 0.01 .012 .08 5.72 
  (0.43)   (0.03) (0.84) (0.01) (0.14)   (0.89) (0.38) (0.46) 
South Korea 120 .02% 4.38% 0.30 .62*** -.32*** 31.79*** .70% 9.91% 0.07 .27*** -.13 11.77* 
  (0.95)   (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.44)   (0.01) (0.16) (0.07) 
Taiwan 120 -.14% .66% 0.04 .21** .02 9.12 -.005% 7.97% 0.01 .042 .09 7.19 
   (0.37)   (0.03) (0.83) (0.17) (0.99)   (0.65) (0.31) (0.30) 
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Table 2.2 Cont.              
  Panel A : Exchange Rate Returns Panel B : Equity Market Returns
Country 
Number of  
Monthly  
Returns Mean Std Dev R2 ρ(1) ρ(2) LB(6) Mean Std Dev R2 ρ(1) ρ(2) LB(6) 
Western Europe             
France 120 -.49%** 2.50% 0.03 .16* -.09 6.57 .59% 6.03% 0.02 .027 .14 5.75 
  (0.03)   (0.08) (0.32) (0.36) (0.28)   (0.77) (0.12) (0.45) 
Germany 120 -.50%** 2.50% 0.03 .16* -.09 6.45 .61% 7.20% 0.01 .05 .093 8.09 
  (0.03)   (0.08) (0.32) (0.37) (0.36)   (0.58) (0.31) (0.23) 
Greece 120 -.50%** 2.6% 0.02 .15 .0002 5.41 .97% 8.74% 0.003 .06 -.01 9.54 
  (0.04)   (0.12) (1.00) (0.49) (0.23)   (0.51) (0.92) (0.15) 
Ireland 120 -.79% 11.99% 0.27 -.59*** -.23*** 71.71*** .84%* 5.50% 0.01 .11 -.05 5.97 
  (0.47)   (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.10)   (0.23) (0.57) (0.43) 
Italy 120 -.51%** 2.50% 0.03 .16* -.09 6.45 .74% 6.02% 0.01 .03 .09 2.08 
  (0.03)   (0.09) (0.32) (0.38) (0.18)   (0.77) (0.32) (0.91) 
Netherlands 120 -.49%** 2.5% 0.03 .16* -.09 6.51 .27% 6.60% 0.03 -.03 .16** 7.98 
  (0.03)   (0.08) (0.32) (0.37) (0.65)   (0.74) (0.08) (0.24) 
Spain 120 -.50%** 2.5% 0.03 .16* -.09 6.48 .82% 6.15% 0.001 -.02 .02 2.68 
  (0.03)   (0.08) (0.31) (0.37) (0.15)   (0.84) (0.81) (0.85) 
Switzerland 120 .16% 2.84% 0.0005 .0001 -.02 4.52 .40% 5.41% 0.02 .12 -.07 4.19 
  (0.54)   (1.00) (0.81) (0.61) (0.41)   (0.19) (0.45) (0.65) 
United Kingdom 120 -.16% 2.15% 0.03 -.10 -.14 7.05 .28% 4.20% 0.01 -.05 .05 3.16 
   (0.41)   (0.26) (0.14) (0.32) (0.47)   (0.60) (0.58) (0.79) 
United States 120       .44% 4.13% 0.02 .09 -.09 2.85 
        (0.24)   (0.32) (0.34) (0.83) 
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2.6 Empirical Results and Discussions 
The SEO results will be discussed first, since the size of the SEO set is larger and is more 
representative of a typical issue. This is followed by IPO results in section b.  
a. Seasoned Equity Offers 
Table 2.3 reports the regression results for the SEO sample. Regarding the SEOs as a 
whole, the finding seems to suggest that the SEO issuers time the U.S. equity market as the 
coefficient for the U.S. equity market returns, β2(h), is positive for all the event windows before 
and one month after the issuance and negative thereafter. The coefficients are significant for the 
pre-issue 6-month and 1-month and post-issue 6-month. However, the results also suggest that 
the firms maybe issuing the ADRs too early. In addition, Table 2.3 implies that the SEO issuers 
have some timing ability regarding the currency market, since the coefficient for currency market 
returns, β3(h), is significantly negative in the post-issue 2-month event window. But the evidence 
in timing the currency market is not as obvious as in the timing of the U.S. equity market. 
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Table 2.3 Analysis of the Impact of Home Equity, U.S. Equity and Currency Market 
Returns on the Proceeds of ADR issues : The Case of All SEOs 
 ( ) ( )
)h()h(cumexrret)h(
)h(cumusreth)h(cummktret)h(hproceeds
ntnt3
nt2nt1int
ν+β
+β+β+α=
 
proceednt is the issue proceeds as a percentage of the firm size of ADR issued by firm i from 
country n in month t, cummktretnt(h) is the holding period home equity market return of country 
n in month t for an event window h, cumusretnt(h) is the holding period U.S. equity market return 
in month t for an event window h, cumexretnt(h) is the holding period dollar exchange rate return 
of country n at month t for an event window h.  
 
Event Window β1(h) p-value β2(h) p-value β3(h) p-value Adj. R2 
        
6 months before -9987*** 0.01 12795* 0.07 -7154 0.25 0.07 
5 months before -10734*** 0.01 7800 0.30 -6920 0.32 0.06 
4 months before -8351* 0.08 7927 0.36 -1989 0.73 0.04 
3 months before -11568** 0.02 14570 0.16 1145 0.88 0.03 
2 months before -8314 0.13 12521 0.29 2780 0.84 -0.07 
1 month before -18644** 0.02 47239*** 0.01 -1981 0.93 0.06 
        
1 month after -10316 0.19 3574 0.82 -5811 0.64 -0.01 
2 months after -1279 0.81 -17201 0.13 -31194* 0.07 0.04 
3 months after -662 0.87 -14608 0.16 -19630 0.19 0.02 
4 months after 560 0.87 -4668 0.59 -7583 0.57 -0.03 
5 months after 1529 0.66 -11008 0.14 -9134 0.45 -0.03 
6 months after 3092 0.30 -14102** 0.02 -12695 0.25 0.04 
        
Obs 79       
(*), (**) and (***) indicate the estimate is significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
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Arguably the ability of market timing could depend on firm volatility. It is plausible that 
more volatile firms would have more incentive to time the issuance. To investigate this 
possibility and also as an additional robustness check, we separate the sample into high-beta 
(beta > 1) and low-beta (beta < 1) stocks, where beta is a measure of firm volatility. As 
illustrated in Table 2.4, the evidence for timing the U.S. equity market appears to be present for 
high-beta stocks. On the other hand, Table 2.5 shows no significant pattern emerges for the low-
beta stocks. These differences in the two groups are consistent with our expectation. The results 
reinforce the previous conclusion that there is some evidence of SEO firms timing the U.S. 
equity market, particularly the high beta ones.  
As mentioned earlier, another important objective of this study is to examine the role of 
regulations. To this end, we compare the timing evidence between tightly and loosely regulated 
countries and before and after SOX. Tables 2.6 and 2.7 provide the results for the two types of 
countries. From Table 2.6, SEO issuers in the tightly regulated countries seem to time the U.S. 
equity market. This is suggested by the positive coefficients for the U.S. equity market returns, 
β2(h), throughout the pre-issue periods and negative for the post-issue periods. They are 
statistically significant in the 1-month and 6-month before and all the periods except 1-month 
and 4-month after the issuance. Table 2.7 shows that there might be some possible timing of the 
home equity market or currency market by the SEO issuers in the loosely regulated countries as 
β1(h) is significantly positive in the pre-issue 4-month and 5-month and β3(h) is significantly 
negative in the post-issue 6-month period for the home and currency market respectively. It 
could be that tightly regulated countries have more regulations in both their stock market and 
currency market. Thus, the SEO issuers of these countries tend to time the U.S. market. On the 
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other hand, there are relatively fewer restrictions in the stock and currency markets in the loosely 
regulated countries, thus making it possible for SEO issuers to time these two markets.  
To investigate the effect of the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley Act on the market timing 
ability of the ADR issuers, the entire SEO sample is also divided between the pre-SOX and post-
SOX periods. Table 2.8 reports the results for the pre-SOX subsample whereas Table 2.9 for the 
post-SOX subsample. There is some evidence that, as shown in Table 2.8, SEO issuers time the 
U.S. equity market before the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (which imposes greater 
disclosure requirements and higher liability to key management officers in firms that issue 
securities in the U.S., be they local or foreign firms). Table 2.9 demonstrates that SEO issuers 
appear to switch to time the currency market after the SOX passage. It can be seen in the table 
that the coefficient for the currency market returns, β3(h), is significantly negative in all the post-
issue periods. This is logical since SOX, to some extent, adds to the regulatory restrictions in the 
U.S. equity market and in turn increase the difficulty in timing this market.      
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Table 2.4 Analysis of the Impact of Home Equity, U.S. Equity and Currency Market 
Returns on the Proceeds of ADR issues : The Case of SEOs with High Beta 
 ( ) ( )
)h()h(cumexrret)h(
)h(cumusreth)h(cummktret)h(hproceeds
ntnt3
nt2nt1int
ν+β
+β+β+α=
 
proceednt is the issue proceeds as a percentage of the firm size of ADR issued by firm i from 
country n in month t, cummktretnt(h) is the holding period home equity market return of country 
n in month t for an event window h, cumusretnt(h) is the holding period U.S. equity market return 
in month t for an event window h, cumexretnt(h) is the holding period dollar exchange rate return 
of country n at month t for an event window h.  
 
Event Window β1(h) p-value β2(h) p-value β3(h) p-value Adj. R2 
        
6 months before -19157*** 0.00 29524** 0.02 2819 0.86 0.16 
5 months before -19546*** 0.00 20174 0.14 -15523 0.49 0.12 
4 months before -14100* 0.08 15407 0.34 -68 1.00 0.01 
3 months before -21034** 0.02 27574 0.14 -248 1.00 0.06 
2 months before -18218* 0.09 26761 0.24 596 0.98 0.07 
1 month before -40973*** 0.01 99719*** 0.00 9138 0.82 0.16 
        
1 month after -23227 0.13 23400 0.44 -6988 0.69 -0.01 
2 months after -2858 0.79 -21478 0.28 -51722* 0.08 0.05 
3 months after -1011 0.89 -16099 0.41 -28167 0.29 0.01 
4 months after 153 0.98 -2896 0.86 -13859 0.59 -0.06 
5 months after 2576 0.67 -15647 0.24 -12656 0.63 -0.02 
6 months after 8378 .0284 -22335** .005 -20806 .42 0.05 
        
Obs 47       
(*), (**) and (***) indicate the estimate is significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
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Table 2.5 Analysis of the Impact of Home Equity, U.S. Equity and Currency Market 
Returns on the Proceeds of ADR issues : The Case of SEOs with Low Beta 
 ( ) ( )
)h()h(cumexrret)h(
)h(cumusreth)h(cummktret)h(hproceeds
ntnt3
nt2nt1int
ν+β
+β+β+α=
 
proceednt is the issue proceeds as a percentage of the firm size of ADR issued by firm i from 
country n in month t, cummktretnt(h) is the holding period home equity market return of country 
n in month t for an event window h, cumusretnt(h) is the holding period U.S. equity market return 
in month t for an event window h, cumexretnt(h) is the holding period dollar exchange rate return 
of country n at month t for an event window h.  
 
Event Window β1(h) p-value β2(h) p-value β3(h) p-value Adj. R2 
        
6 months before -.002 0.97 .13 0.35 -.09 0.33 -0.04 
5 months before .02 0.80 .14 0.32 -.07 0.51 -0.04 
4 months before .04 0.69 .14 0.42 -.02 0.82 -0.05 
3 months before .05 0.58 -.01 0.96 -.03 0.81 -0.09 
2 months before .01 0.95 .02 0.94 .22 0.41 -0.08 
1 month before -.03 0.81 -.07 0.85 .69 0.14 -0.003 
        
1 month after -.03 0.83 .07 0.82 .05 0.91 -0.10 
2 months after -.02 0.85 .19 0.43 .24 0.47 -0.07 
3 months after .01 0.89 .23 0.31 .01 0.99 -0.05 
4 months after .04 0.53 .21 0.29 -.02 0.94 -0.03 
5 months after .002 0.98 .09 0.58 -.01 0.97 -0.07 
6 months after -.02 0.76 .14 0.26 .01 0.95 -0.05 
        
Obs 32       
(*), (**) and (***) indicate the estimate is significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
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Table 2.6 Analysis of the Impact of Home Equity, U.S. Equity and Currency Market 
Returns on the Proceeds of ADR issues : The Case of SEOs of Tightly Regulated Countries 
 ( ) ( )
)h()h(cumexrret)h(
)h(cumusreth)h(cummktret)h(hproceeds
ntnt3
nt2nt1int
ν+β
+β+β+α=
 
proceednt is the issue proceeds as a percentage of the firm size of ADR issued by firm i from 
country n in month t, cummktretnt(h) is the holding period home equity market return of country 
n in month t for an event window h, cumusretnt(h) is the holding period U.S. equity market return 
in month t for an event window h, cumexretnt(h) is the holding period dollar exchange rate return 
of country n at month t for an event window h.  
 
Event Window β1(h) p-value β2(h) p-value β3(h) p-value R2 
        
6 months before -12855*** 0.01 17445* 0.06 -11348 0.15 0.10 
5 months before -14063*** 0.01 12761 0.19 -9725 0.26 0.09 
4 months before -10479* 0.08 11099 0.35 -4332 0.61 0.01 
3 months before -12656** 0.04 15904 0.21 1429 0.89 0.03 
2 months before -9903 0.14 16768 0.29 4959 0.83 -0.01 
1 month before -20521** 0.04 56386** 0.02 -1735 0.96 0.06 
        
1 month after -10665 0.29 -7977 0.71 -47725 0.19 0.01 
2 months after -993 0.88 -28343* 0.06 -45640** 0.04 0.07 
3 months after 643 0.90 -25663* 0.08 -32877 0.11 0.06 
4 months after 1339 0.77 -9502 0.43 -16263 0.41 -0.03 
5 months after 2303 0.60 -17749* 0.08 -16944 0.31 0.01 
6 months after 4351 0.23 -21739*** 0.01 -21179 0.13 0.08 
        
Obs 60       
(*), (**) and (***) indicate the estimate is significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
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Table 2.7 Analysis of the Impact of Home Equity, U.S. Equity and Currency Market 
Returns on the Proceeds of ADR issues : The Case of SEOs of Loosely Regulations 
Countries 
 ( ) ( )
)h()h(cumexrret)h(
)h(cumusreth)h(cummktret)h(hproceeds
ntnt3
nt2nt1int
ν+β
+β+β+α=
 
proceednt is the issue proceeds as a percentage of the firm size of ADR issued by firm i from 
country n in month t, cummktretnt(h) is the holding period home equity market return of country 
n in month t for an event window h, cumusretnt(h) is the holding period U.S. equity market return 
in month t for an event window h, cumexretnt(h) is the holding period dollar exchange rate return 
of country n at month t for an event window h.  
 
Event Window β1(h) p-value β2(h) p-value β3(h) p-value Adj. R2 
        
6 months before .13 0.52 .22 0.43 -.13 0.60 0.01 
5 months before .27* 0.10 .32 0.20 .14 0.59 0.20 
4 months before .29* 0.10 .33 0.18 .09 0.43 0.31 
3 months before .45 0.21 .06 0.90 -.004 0.99 0.05 
2 months before .49 0.16 -.28 0.50 -.10 0.73 -0.03 
1 month before -.17 0.76 .26 0.73 .32 0.66 -0.18 
        
1 month after .02 0.95 .13 0.82 -.24 0.25 -0.07 
2 months after .11 0.59 .18 0.65 .06 0.92 -0.11 
3 months after .07 0.69 .18 0.54 -.20 0.69 -0.08 
4 months after .11 0.37 .33 0.18 -.33 0.28 0.16 
5 months after .10 0.45 .11 0.58 -.43 0.18 0.11 
6 months after .12 0.32 .12 0.46 -.63* 0.07 0.19 
        
Obs 19       
(*), (**) and (***) indicate the estimate is significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
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Table 2.8 Analysis of the Impact of Home Equity, U.S. Equity and Currency Market 
Returns on the Proceeds of ADR issues : The Case of SEOs in the Pre-SOX period 
 ( ) ( )
)h()h(cumexrret)h(
)h(cumusreth)h(cummktret)h(hproceeds
ntnt3
nt2nt1int
ν+β
+β+β+α=
 
proceednt is the issue proceeds as a percentage of the firm size of ADR issued by firm i from 
country n in month t, cummktretnt(h) is the holding period home equity market return of country 
n in month t for an event window h, cumusretnt(h) is the holding period U.S. equity market return 
in month t for an event window h, cumexretnt(h) is the holding period dollar exchange rate return 
of country n at month t for an event window h.  
 
Event Window β1(h) p-value β2(h) p-value β3(h) p-value Adj. R2 
        
6 months before -21468*** 0.01 28191* 0.09 -18079 0.12 0.12 
5 months before -19631** 0.03 15782 0.37 -12636 0.29 0.08 
4 months before -13710 0.17 12739 0.60 -4272 0.68 -0.03 
3 months before -17720* 0.09 23466 0.40 1432 0.92 0.01 
2 months before -11497 0.30 17716 0.50 6177 0.88 -0.06 
1 month before -25403 0.11 70028* 0.06 -8045 0.88 0.04 
        
1 month after -14766 0.37 167 1.00 -5283 0.80 -0.07 
2 months after -4196 0.68 -30778 0.17 -54117 0.13 0.02 
3 months after -3486 0.67 -30396 0.17 -31169 0.32 0.01 
4 months after 2102 0.78 -6877 0.75 -11164 0.72 -0.10 
5 months after 3923 0.60 -26260 0.17 -31369 0.34 -0.03 
6 months after 5469 0.39 -34613** 0.03 -42983 0.12 0.09 
        
Obs 33       
(*), (**) and (***) indicate the estimate is significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
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Table 2.9 Analysis of the Impact of Home Equity, U.S. Equity and Currency Market 
Returns on the Proceeds of ADR issues : The Case of SEOs in the Post-SOX period  
 ( ) ( )
)h()h(cumexrret)h(
)h(cumusreth)h(cummktret)h(hproceeds
ntnt3
nt2nt1int
ν+β
+β+β+α=
 
proceednt is the issue proceeds as a percentage of the firm size of ADR issued by firm i from 
country n in month t, cummktretnt(h) is the holding period home equity market return of country 
n in month t for an event window h, cumusretnt(h) is the holding period U.S. equity market return 
in month t for an event window h, cumexretnt(h) is the holding period dollar exchange rate return 
of country n at month t for an event window h.  
 
Event Window β1(h) p-value β2(h) p-value β3(h) p-value Adj. R2 
        
6 months before .02 0.80 .40 0.11 -.51* 0.10 0.10 
5 months before .06 0.50   .16 0.43 -.62* 0.10 0.02 
4 months before .07 0.57 .05 0.80 -.18 0.68   -0.07 
3 months before .08 0.59 -.21 0.38 -.07 0.88 -0.06 
2 months before .03 0.83 -.27 0.45 .19 0.67 -0.07 
1 month before .09 0.66 -.86 0.11 -.86 0.16 0.05 
        
1 month after -.08 0.74 -.46 0.49 -1.14** 0.03 0.12 
2 months after -.05 0.78 .21 0.66 -.85** 0.03 0.09 
3 months after .07 0.45 -.06 0.87 -1.16*** 0.00 0.20 
4 months after .05 0.46 -.02 0.93 -.85*** 0.00 0.19 
5 months after .04 0.56 .11 0.66 -.53** 0.02 0.09 
6 months after .04 0.55 .06 0.81 -.44** 0.05 0.04 
        
Obs 37       
(*), (**) and (***) indicate the estimate is significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
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b. Initial Public Offers 
Table 2.10 reports the regression results for the IPO sample. With respect to the IPO 
sample as a whole, there is little evidence of market timing. The significantly positive coefficient 
for the home equity market returns, β1(h), in the pre-issue 1-month period might suggest some 
market timing but the evidence is not very obvious. This suggests that managers have little 
timing ability on either equity markets or the currency market. These results seem to make sense, 
as managers here have no prior experiences in stock markets. To examine if the market timing 
effects are blurred by the inclusion of firms with different originations or different time periods, 
we again divide the entire IPO sample between tightly regulated and loosely regulated countries 
as well as before and after the passage of SOX. Table 2.11 shows that IPO firms from tightly 
regulated countries time the U.S. equity market since β2(h) is significantly positive in the pre-
issue 3-month to 6-month periods. On the other hand, loosely regulated country IPO firms, as 
illustrated in Table 2.12, do not seem to time any of the three markets. There is no significant 
pattern observed in this table. As for the pre-SOX and post-SOX subsamples, Table 1.13 
suggests that there is no market timing observed for the IPO issuers before SOX but Table 2.14 
provides some evidence that, post SOX, there is some timing of the U.S. equity market. The 
difference between pre- and post-SOX is contrary to our expectations. Nevertheless, the overall 
evidence of timing effects of IPOs is weak.  
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Table 2.10 Analysis of the Impact of Home Equity, U.S. Equity and Currency Market 
Returns on the Proceeds of ADR issues : The Case of all IPOs 
 ( ) ( )
)h()h(cumexrret)h(
)h(cumusreth)h(cummktret)h(hproceeds
ntnt3
nt2nt1int
ν+β
+β+β+α=
 
proceednt is the issue proceeds as a percentage of the firm size of ADR issued by firm i from 
country n in month t, cummktretnt(h) is the holding period home equity market return of country 
n in month t for an event window h, cumusretnt(h) is the holding period U.S. equity market return 
in month t for an event window h, cumexretnt(h) is the holding period dollar exchange rate return 
of country n at month t for an event window h.  
 
Event Window β1(h) p-value β2(h) p-value β3(h) p-value Adj. R2 
        
6 months before -.25 0.25 .58 0.29 .48 0.57 -0.02 
5 months before -.18 0.44 .42 0.49 .07 0.94 -0.04 
4 months before -.15 0.63 .80 0.27 -.71 0.54 -0.02 
3 months before -.05 0.87 1.31 0.11 .16 0.92 -0.001 
2 months before .45 0.31 .64 0.53 -2.60 0.14 0.03 
1 month before 1.10* 0.07 -.04 0.97 -.32 0.87 0.03 
        
1 month after -.33 0.51 .004 1.00 .02 0.99 -0.05 
2 months after -.34 0.28 .007 0.99 1.62 0.43 -0.02 
3 months after -.13 0.53 -.27 0.77 2.42* 0.09 0.01 
4 months after -.26 0.17 .64 0.28 1.84 0.12 0.02 
5 months after -.18 0.25 .72 0.11 1.64** 0.06 0.05 
6 months after -.18 0.20 .52 0.26 1.56** 0.06 0.04 
        
Obs 55       
(*), (**) and (***) indicate the estimate is significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
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Table 2.11 Analysis of the Impact of Home Equity, U.S. Equity and Currency Market 
Returns on the Proceeds of ADR issues : The Case of IPOs of Tightly Regulated Countries 
 ( ) ( )
)h()h(cumexrret)h(
)h(cumusreth)h(cummktret)h(hproceeds
ntnt3
nt2nt1int
ν+β
+β+β+α=
 
proceednt is the issue proceeds as a percentage of the firm size of ADR issued by firm i from 
country n in month t, cummktretnt(h) is the holding period home equity market return of country 
n in month t for an event window h, cumusretnt(h) is the holding period U.S. equity market return 
in month t for an event window h, cumexretnt(h) is the holding period dollar exchange rate return 
of country n at month t for an event window h.  
 
Event Window β1(h) p-value β2(h) p-value β3(h) p-value Adj. R2 
        
6 months before -.22 0.21 1.56*** 0.01 .26 0.74 0.13 
5 months before -.17 0.38 1.30** 0.04 -.03 0.97 0.04 
4 months before -.25 0.32 1.80*** 0.01 -.23 0.83 0.09 
3 months before .06 0.80 1.38* 0.08 .08 0.96 0.03 
2 months before .45 0.26 .49 0.63 -1.50 0.53 -0.01 
1 month before 1.22** 0.04 -1.08 0.34 2.16 0.41 0.06 
        
1 month after -.12 0.80 .64 0.62 3.63 0.30 -0.05 
2 months after -.30 0.29 1.02 0.27 3.18 0.15 0.01 
3 months after -.11 0.59 .26 0.80 2.17 0.11 -0.004 
4 months after -.14 0.40 .36 0.58 1.63 0.14 -0.01 
5 months after -.09 0.52 .36 0.42 1.18 0.18 -0.02 
6 months after -.11 0.39 .21 0.64 1.08 0.20 -0.02 
        
Obs 39       
(*), (**) and (***) indicate the estimate is significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
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Table 2.12 Analysis of the Impact of Home Equity, U.S. Equity and Currency Market 
Returns on the Proceeds of ADR issues : The Case of IPOs of Loosely Regulated Countries 
 ( ) ( )
)h()h(cumexrret)h(
)h(cumusreth)h(cummktret)h(hproceeds
ntnt3
nt2nt1int
ν+β
+β+β+α=
 
proceednt is the issue proceeds as a percentage of the firm size of ADR issued by firm i from 
country n in month t, cummktretnt(h) is the holding period home equity market return of country 
n in month t for an event window h, cumusretnt(h) is the holding period U.S. equity market return 
in month t for an event window h, cumexretnt(h) is the holding period dollar exchange rate return 
of country n at month t for an event window h.  
 
Event Window β1(h) p-value β2(h) p-value β3(h) p-value Adj. R2 
        
6 months before -.09 0.95 -.57 0.81 -.22 0.93 -0.21 
5 months before -.30 0.85 -.83 0.74 -1.70 0.51 -0.14 
4 months before .58 0.72 -1.64 0.51 -3.85 0.24 -0.08 
3 months before -2.42 0.20 3.13 0.30 -.14 0.97 -0.07 
2 months before -.33 0.87 .263 0.94 -3.71 0.31 -0.12 
1 month before 1.37 0.50 1.86 0.65 -2.14 0.56 -0.08 
        
1 month after -1.15 0.51 -.84 0.76 -1.68 0.76 -0.13 
2 months after -1.19 0.53 -1.65 0.61 -.92 0.87 -0.06 
3 months after -.24 0.80 -.96 0.66 3.32 0.51 -0.14 
4 months after -1.59 0.23 2.08 0.20 .96 0.83 -0.04 
5 months after -.70 0.45 1.92 0.13 2.51 0.28 0.04 
6 months after -.85 0.45 2.18 0.16 3.44 0.24 0.04 
        
Obs 16       
(*), (**) and (***) indicate the estimate is significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
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Table 2.13 Analysis of the Impact of Home Equity, U.S. Equity and Currency Market 
Returns on the Proceeds of ADR issues : The Case of IPOs in the Pre-SOX period 
 ( ) ( )
)h()h(cumexrret)h(
)h(cumusreth)h(cummktret)h(hproceeds
ntnt3
nt2nt1int
ν+β
+β+β+α=
 
proceednt is the issue proceeds as a percentage of the firm size of ADR issued by firm i from 
country n in month t, cummktretnt(h) is the holding period home equity market return of country 
n in month t for an event window h, cumusretnt(h) is the holding period U.S. equity market return 
in month t for an event window h, cumexretnt(h) is the holding period dollar exchange rate return 
of country n at month t for an event window h.  
 
Event Window β1(h) p-value β2(h) p-value β3(h) p-value Adj. R2 
        
6 months before -.04 0.93 .19 0.83 .84 0.57 -0.17 
5 months before -.03 0.94 -.15 0.86 .15 0.92 -0.19 
4 months before .11 0.84 -.66 0.48 -1.99 0.30 -0.09 
3 months before -.03 0.96 .74 0.52 .96 0.76 -0.17 
2 months before 1.02 0.26 -.52 0.64 -3.66 0.14 0.02 
1 month before 1.21 0.25 -.15 0.91 2.26 0.39 0.00 
        
1 month after -.62 0.39 -.48 0.68 -3.01 0.30 -0.03 
2 months after -.66 0.22 .71 0.55 1.23 0.62 -0.07 
3 months after -.09 0.81 -.57 0.71 2.72 0.14 0.04 
4 months after -.07 0.83 .72 0.28 3.60** 0.05 0.09 
5 months after .11 0.73 .43 0.41 2.16* 0.06 0.06 
6 months after .30 0.31 .19 0.67 2.65*** 0.01 0.24 
        
Obs 19       
(*), (**) and (***) indicate the estimate is significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
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Table 2.14 Analysis of the Impact of Home Equity, U.S. Equity and Currency Market 
Returns on the Proceeds of ADR issues : The Case of IPOs in the Post-SOX period 
 ( ) ( )
)h()h(cumexrret)h(
)h(cumusreth)h(cummktret)h(hproceeds
ntnt3
nt2nt1int
ν+β
+β+β+α=
 
proceednt is the issue proceeds as a percentage of the firm size of ADR issued by firm i from 
country n in month t, cummktretnt(h) is the holding period home equity market return of country 
n in month t for an event window h, cumusretnt(h) is the holding period U.S. equity market return 
in month t for an event window h, cumexretnt(h) is the holding period dollar exchange rate return 
of country n at month t for an event window h.  
 
Event Window β1(h) p-value β2(h) p-value β3(h) p-value Adj. R2 
        
6 months before -.29 0.26 1.61 0.11 -.24 0.84 0.004 
5 months before -.27 0.41 1.43 0.18 -.18 0.88 -0.03 
4 months before -.38 0.30 2.49** 0.03 -.60 0.67 0.07 
3 months before -.03 0.94 1.64 0.24 -1.03 0.59 -0.02 
2 months before .21 0.71 1.92 0.32 -3.23 0.19 0.03 
1 month before .86 0.26 .191 0.93 -4.34 0.13 0.04 
        
1 month after -.15 0.83 1.79 0.45 3.92 0.58 -0.06 
2 months after -.13 0.75 -.35 0.84 -1.71 0.67 -0.08 
3 months after -.09 0.73 -.17 0.92 .436 0.86 -0.09 
4 months after -.20 0.45 .31 0.81 .10 0.96 -0.07 
5 months after -.20 0.34 .88 0.46 .72 0.67 -0.06 
6 months after -.22 0.25 .46 0.73 .38 0.79 -0.05 
        
Obs 35       
(*), (**) and (***) indicate the estimate is significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
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2.7 Conclusions  
In this essay, we examine market timing ability using a sample of 134 capital-raising 
ADR issues from 16 countries issued during the period January 1998 to December 2006. The 
sample is divided into IPOs and SEOs. Furthermore, we compare the timing effects of high- and 
low-beta stocks, tightly and loosely regulated countries, as well as pre- and post-SOX. We focus 
on the proceeds of the individual issues adjusting for firm size in the month of the issuance. For 
the SEO sample, we find that issuers from high-beta and tightly regulated countries seem to be 
able to time the U.S. equity market. In addition, pre-SOX, SEO firms tend to time the U.S. equity 
market whereas post-SOX, they time the home equity or currency markets. The results for the 
IPO set are generally weaker. Overall, ADRs issuers have some timing ability particularly in the 
U.S. equity market. While this is inconsistent with they having information advantage in their 
home countries, it can be explained by the fact that most ADR issuers employ U.S. investment 
banks in issuing ADRs thus are well-informed regarding the U.S. market. There is also evidence 
that, albeit weak, regulations play a role in the issuance decision.       
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A1.1 Correlation of Variables 
 
 LNGNIPC shortsell Distance disclosure director 
liability 
shareholder 
suit 
insider institutional Noise R2 proportion 
of trading 
in US. 
market 
liquidity 
LNGNIP 1.00            
             
Shortsell 0.62*** 
(0.00) 
1.00           
             
Distance -0.13 
  (0.12) 
-0.15* 
(0.06) 
1.00          
             
Disclosure 0.19** 
 (0.02) 
0.35*** 
(0.00) 
0.06 
(0.46) 
1.00         
             
Director 
Liability 
0.25*** 
(0.00) 
0.14* 
(0.09) 
0.12 
(0.14) 
0.26*** 
(0.00) 
1.00        
             
shareholder 
suit 
0.33*** 
 (0.00) 
0.25*** 
(0.00) 
0.43*** 
(0.00) 
0.47*** 
(0.00) 
0.47*** 
(0.00) 
1.00       
             
Insider -0.41*** 
 (0.00) 
-0.23 *** 
 (0.01) 
-0.005 
  (0.95) 
-0.10 
 (0.23) 
-0.18** 
 (0.03) 
-0.22*** 
 (0.01) 
1.00      
             
institutional -0.30*** 
(0.00) 
-0.16** 
 (0.05) 
-0.25*** 
 (0.00) 
-0.02 
 (0.79) 
-0.02 
 (0.81) 
-0.13 
  (0.13) 
0.07 
(0.43) 
1.00     
             
Noise -0.36*** 
 (0.00) 
-0.17** 
 (0.04) 
0.05 
(0.54) 
-0.04 
 (0.65) 
-0.06 
 (0.48) 
-0.001 
 (0.99) 
0.37*** 
(0.00) 
0.11 
(0.20) 
1.00    
             
R2 0.37*** 
(0.00) 
0.15* 
(0.07) 
-0.09 
 (0.29) 
-0.01 
 (0.89) 
0.03 
(0.68) 
-0.03 
( 0.74) 
-0.30*** 
 (0.00) 
-0.22*** 
 (0.01) 
-0.53*** 
 (0.00) 
1.00   
             
proportion of 
trading in US. 
-0.20 ** 
(0.02) 
-0.004 
 (0.95) 
0.001 
(0.99) 
-0.18** 
 (0.03) 
-0.23*** 
 (0.01) 
0.03 
(0.73) 
0.06 
(0.50) 
0.27*** 
(0.00) 
0.11 
(0.19) 
-0.03 
 (0.76) 
1.00  
             
market 
liquidity 
0.31*** 
(0.00) 
0.18** 
 (0.03) 
-0.15* 
 (0.07) 
-0.00 
( 0.99) 
0.09 
(0.28) 
-0.03 
 (0.73) 
-0.25*** 
( 0.00) 
-0.21*** 
 (0.01) 
-0.35***  
 (0.00) 
0.50*** 
(0.00) 
-0.07 
( 0.39) 
1.00 
             
(*), (**) and (***) indicate the estimate is significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
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